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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**INDONESIA: DEFINING NEW OPTIONS IN THE SOCIO-
POLITICAL ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED
FORCES**

by

Harry Haryono

June 2000

Thesis Co-Advisors:

**Thomas C. Bruneau
Denny Roy**

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**INDONESIA: DEFINING NEW OPTIONS IN THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE
OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze civil-military relations in Indonesia since independence in 1949 through the resignation of President Suharto in mid 1998. It will examine the military's exercise of power by using the prerogatives and contestations as defined by Alfred Stepan. The Indonesian Armed Forces (*TNI*) has been deeply involved in socio-political roles since the struggle for independence against the Dutch. Most scholars consider the New Order regime (1966-1998) to have been one dominated by the *TNI*. Suharto resigned in May 21, 1998 and brought an abrupt end to Indonesia's 32-year-old New Order regime and started the process of redrawing the country's political map. The *TNI* as the most powerful political institution has started to decline. A number of the civilian reformist leaders campaigned for the military to return to the barracks immediately and relinquish its political responsibilities. This thesis will argue that the level of the military's socio-political participation has declined in recent years. Therefore, the *TNI* should define new options of its socio-political role in order to fit the harmonious relationship with the Indonesian society in the future.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Indonesian Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or *TNI*) has struggled along with the people to save the country from any form of threats, and the *TNI* has been successful in defending the country and preventing its fragmentation. This is why the *TNI* considered itself different from other countries' armed forces. The *TNI* is not a mere tool of the government, but is actively involved in the decision making process. This way of thinking led the *TNI*'s leaders to the concept called *Dwi Fungsi* or "Dual Function" of the Indonesian Armed Forces. *Dwi Fungsi TNI* obliged the *TNI* to conduct not only security and defense roles but also social and political roles. During the armed struggle, the Indonesian military played the role of a "people's army," leading the population in the fighting against the former colonial masters. The success of this armed struggle strengthened Indonesia's beliefs that a successful military formation and strategy are predicated upon the common people's participation. Towards this end, the Indonesian military had to play an active role in the social and political affairs of the newly emerging state. Because they relied heavily on the support of the local population, the military was always careful to rally popular enthusiasm around their cause; this was the basis of the military's political role. This political role was never relinquished by the military even after independence.

The military has continuously exercised its *Dwi Fungsi* roles in Indonesian society since the struggle for independence. However, the levels of its political influence have fluctuated through the years. This thesis presents the proposition that the Indonesian military's socio-political role has declined in recent years. A comparative method over time is used for this

analysis, examining the levels of military prerogatives and contestations that the military has held over the civilian authorities.

The character of Indonesian military socio-political role has changed since 1949 and an analysis of events during the 1940s and 1950s ascertained that this period represented the formative years of the Indonesian military's political posture. Herein, the military exercised its prerogatives and contestations against civilian decisions affecting mainly military matters, for example, its leadership and structure. Even so, it had experienced failures in its contestation attempts.

The *Orde Lama* or "Old Order" period (1959-1965) was actually in the Guided Democracy period based on the presidential power under Sukarno (the Indonesia's first president or the founding father) regime. This period saw an expansion of the military's political influence. Significantly, the military began to interfere extensively in areas beyond military affairs. It successfully countered Sukarno's moves to sideline its influence, eliminated the *PKI* (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or Indonesian Communist Party) and eventually forced Sukarno out of office. Military initiatives also successfully shape foreign affairs during *Konfrontasi*, Indonesia's armed campaign against the formation of Malaysia in the 1960s. Its success shaped the behavior of all political players, as civilian leaders subsequently had to factor in the military's potential reactions to political decisions. The frequency and scope of military prerogatives and contestations during *Orde Lama* thus illustrated a leap from those previously undertaken.

Orde Baru or the "New Order" period (1966-1998) under Suharto was marked by a basic difference in ideology from Soekarno's Guided Democracy. The New Order stressed stability and economic development, rather than the mass mobilization and ideological confrontation

that was characteristic of the Sukarno regime. This period saw a general decline of the military's influence in politics, although it continued to play an important role exercising its social roles at the lower levels of Indonesian society. Suharto's intimate knowledge of the military enabled him to exercise a relatively successful "checks-and-balances" strategy in containing the military's political role. His continued employment of loyalists in key positions ensured that he maintained effective control over the military. By the 1990s, he had rendered the military leadership basically impotent.

During the new order, Suharto played a significant part in marginalizing the military's socio-political role. Suharto's own mandate in ensuring his rule and the prosperity of his family probably dictated the military's directions during *Orde Baru*. This state of events remained until the economic downturn in 1997 and 1998, which unleashed a wave of discontent in Indonesia that Suharto could not suppress, ultimately leading to his resignation. This crisis also released the military from Suharto's grasp, allowing it to exercise its own initiatives in the post-Suharto era. Until now, the military leadership apparently had decided to continue with the reduction of the institution's socio-political role, although it had emphasized that it would not consider a total elimination of these roles. Desires to reduce its political influence in the face of democracy, to regain legitimacy after its excesses in the past decades, and to return to professionalism are the probable intra-military reasons prescribing its decision to reduce the socio-political role. In addition, societal demands as well as international pressure also forced the military's hand.

An understanding of the circumstances leading to the crystallization and decline of the Indonesian military's socio-political role provides a better insight into Indonesia's extremely dynamic political situation. The coming years will be crucial in the formation of Indonesia's

new political landscape, and the military's initiatives in this area will have a definitive effect on these developments. Even with the implementation of more democratic reforms, the military will likely maintain a stake in the new system. This is to ensure the stability of the social and political situation domestically, as well as to safeguard its own interests.

Since the *TNI's* Dual Function has been basic to the *TNI's* origins, it will not be removed from the *TNI* as long as the *TNI* is still in existence. However, the implementation of the *TNI's* Dual Function will be adjusted from time to time to reflect the existing situation. In the future, the *TNI* will operate in a new environment that may challenge the implementation of the *TNI's* Dual Function. The *TNI* must operate within the trends of Indonesia's future environment. This means that the *TNI's* Dual Function must become more acceptable and palatable to the non-governmental organization and to the international community, especially the various international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations, such as political parties. However, to face future challenges, the *TNI* has to take some steps regarding the implementation of the *TNI's* Dual Function in the changing environment. The *TNI* has to reevaluate the concept of its Dual Function in order to fit the needs of the existing environment, and also it has to formulate broad guidelines as to how the *TNI's* Dual Function will be implemented in the near future. Without its influence, there is a possibility that Indonesia will revert to the chaotic times of the 1950s. Growth of the backward regions of the archipelago will also be severely hindered if the military does not participate in social programs in these areas. In the medium to long term, the situation may change with the maturing of the democratic movements and the establishment of non-military social organizations. Then the military can concentrate its attention on developing a professional armed force befitting its size and influence in the Southeast Asian region. Furthermore, the important thing is that the *TNI*

with its new paradigm must become more acceptable and palatable to the non government organizations, such as political parties and to the international community, and finally that the *TNI* has a good relationship come along with the Indonesian society in the future.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Dual Function of *ABRI* (*Dwi Fungsi ABRI*) are functions possessed by and adhering to the Armed Forces as defense and security forces and as social forces, in the context of the national struggle to achieve national goals in conforming with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.¹

The Indonesian Armed Forces (*ABRI*² or *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or *TNI*) were born in the turbulence of revolution and have never been merely an instrument to maintain security. The *TNI* have not only a military technical mission, but also had a mission in every field of social life. Since the revolution for independence from Dutch colonial rule, the Indonesian military has played a social and political role in the national arena. The failure to secure independence from the Dutch via diplomatic means forced the young military to take a more active role towards this end. During the armed struggle (1945-1949), the Indonesian military played the role of a "people's army," leading the population in the fight against the former colonial masters. Even when the Dutch forces arrested the civilian leaders—Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta—in December 1948, the military did not cease its attacks but instead redoubled its efforts, culminating in its

¹ Minister of Defense & Security/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces: "*Manual on Dual Functions of the Armed Forces, Republic of Indonesia*" (Jakarta: Department of Defense and Security, 1982).

² *ABRI* stands for *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* or the Indonesian Armed Forces after the army, the navy, the air force, and the state police unified command structure. In October 1998, General Wiranto declared that the National Police would be separated from the military beginning 1 April 1999. For the first year or two, the police were to remain under the authority of the Minister of Defense, although Wiranto left open the possibility of transferring the police to the Home Ministry in the future. Under the terms of the April separation, the police were (in Wiranto's words) "to fight crimes, to love humanity and to protect the public," presumably by using of non-lethal force (*Jakarta Post*, 5 April 1999). The remaining armed forces would be renamed "*Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)*," the historic name of the military from the days of the anti-colonial revolution.

attacks on the city of Yogyakarta on 1 March 1949. General Sudirman, the Army Commander, decided to continue the war against the Dutch rule with his popular motto "*BERJUANG TERUS MET ZONDER PEMERINTAH*," which means that the army will continue to struggle defending the Indonesian independence against Dutch forces without the support of government leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta. This proved to be the turning point of the independence struggle, with both sides subsequently agreeing to resume negotiations that resulted in the formation of an independent Indonesia on 27 December 1949.

The success of this armed struggle strengthened the Indonesian's belief that a successful military formation and strategy are predicated upon the common people's participation since October 1945 when Sukarno proclaimed the formation of *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* (TKR or People's Security Army). This belief is reflected in the Indonesian military's basic military strategy *Sishankamrata* or "Total People's Defense System." Towards this end, the Indonesian military had to play an active role in the social and political affairs of the newly emerging state. Because it relied heavily on the support of the local population, the military was always concerned to rally popular enthusiasm around its cause. This formed the basis of the military's political role. The Indonesian military never relinquished this political role even after independence. Later, after the introduction of martial law in 1957, the army Chief-of-Staff Major General Abdul Haris Nasution formulated the concept of the "Middle Way,"³ in which the

³ The middle way stipulated that the army would neither seek to take over the government nor remain politically inactive.

military claimed the right to continuous representation in the legislature and government administration. The military further developed this "Middle Way" concept into the doctrine of *Dwi Fungsi* or "Dual Function" roles in 1965—A military force as well as a socio-political force.⁴

In 1965, President Suharto emerged as the master manipulator of Indonesia's internal politics, until his downfall in May 1998. Throughout his rule, he maintained a credible "checks-and-balances" system to ensure that the different factions in Indonesia's domestic scene did not become powerful enough to challenge his rule. Even though he was a former military general, Suharto did not spare the armed forces from his manipulations, often balancing them against the Muslim factions in the country. In addition, he exploited the "*Dwi Fungsi*" aspect of the military's roles to assist in his rule of Indonesian for the past 32 years. However, this did not mean that the military was always subservient to politicians, even in Suharto's largely authoritarian rule. Throughout its history, the military has confronted politicians, struggling to tilt the balance between civil and military powers. However, it has appeared that the military's influence in civil affairs has waned in recent years. During his years in office, Suharto succeeded in reducing the military's formal representation in the political arena. In addition, there have been calls for the military to "return to the barracks" or to become a purely professional force. Even though the military played a part in the recent removal of

⁴ Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 1988), 24.

Suharto as president, its profile appeared significantly lower when compared to the situation in 1965-66, when Suharto succeeded Sukarno.

A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

There remain many unanswered questions, including what will be the civil-military relations format in the post-Suharto era? The military itself has no ready answer to this central question. A decline in socio-political functions of the Indonesian military will have an impact on Indonesian society, given the leading roles that the military played in previous decades. If the non-military roles continue to decline in the post-Suharto era, the future development of the Indonesian military as a professional armed force will also be affected. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine the reasons for and direction and pace of this decline, so that one can predict future developments within the military and the Indonesian society.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

To guide the direction of the thesis there are several research questions that can be used to determine the aims and scope of the study.

The primary question: What is the proper role for the Indonesian Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or *TNI*) in order to harmonize civil-military relations in the post-Suharto era?

Supporting questions:

1. How has the *TNI* socio-political role changed since 1949, and especially in recent years?

2. What are the effects on Indonesian society and the *TNI* as a result of the changes in the military's socio-political role?

3. How does the *TNI* respond to the civilians reformist leaders' campaign for the military to return to the barracks immediately and relinquish its political responsibilities?

C. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is important because it will demonstrate that the level of the Indonesian military's socio-political participation has declined in recent years, and will also present the likely causes of the decline, especially the extent to which ex-President Suharto was responsible for lower levels of participation. It will also examine the effects that the military's socio-political participation have on Indonesian society and on the military itself. In addition, it finds that to respond to the demand that the military must return to the barracks, the *TNI* should redefine its socio-political role in order to harmonize its relationship with Indonesian society in the future.

D. THESIS SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The scope of the thesis will cover developments since 1949, when Indonesia struggled to achieve independence from the Dutch and when the Indonesian military began to play a legitimate and expanding role in the socio-political arena, until 1998 when Suharto resigned. The thesis will examine the social and political functions of the armed forces, with special emphasis on the political roles that have undergone the most erosion in recent years. The thesis will also highlight the costs and benefits arising from

the changing nature of these roles, so that inferences can be drawn on the effects of further decline in the military's socio-political role. Finally, the thesis will speculate about the *TNI's* socio-political roles in the future that could be acceptable domestically and internationally.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Following this introductory chapter, the Second Chapter will trace and cover the origins of the military's socio-political roles, and will present a historical account of the development and realization of these roles in Indonesian society. It will also evaluate the costs and benefits brought by the military's social involvement.

The Third Chapter will address the decline of the military's socio-political roles in recent years. The level of participation of the military in the social and political arenas will be compared over time. In particular, historical events in Indonesia in which the military has challenged the civilian politicians will be studied to determine both the type and intensity of these challenges.

The Fourth Chapter will put forward some reasons for the decline of the military's socio-political roles in Indonesian society. As Indonesia matures and the civilians are ready, the military would want to retreat to the background of the socio-political arena and allow civilians to take the lead in these areas, unless the civilians seriously threaten the military's basic ideals. In addition, this chapter will analyze the influence of President Suharto in determining the level of the military's socio-political participation as well as the reasons why he marginalized the military in the political landscape over the last

decade. Finally, this chapter will address the impact of the reduced level of political and social participation by the military in both the military and within Indonesian society.

The Fifth Chapter will address the *TNI's* socio-political roles in the future. This chapter is the concluding chapter, and it will also recommend proper roles for the *TNI* to harmonize its relationship with Indonesian society in the future.

F. METHODOLOGY

The analysis will use the comparative method over time to examine the involvement of the military in social and political affairs. The method chosen to analyze the political influences of the Indonesian military is modeled after Alfred Stepan's "*Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*,"⁵ an examination of military politics in Latin America. This method analyzes the levels of military prerogatives and contestations employed by the military towards the civilian authorities.

1. Military Prerogatives

The meaning of the word "prerogative" is "a special privilege or power that one has or is allowed to have."⁶ Alfred Stepan defines "military prerogative" as "those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes it has an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or even

⁵ Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1988).

⁶ *Collins English Language Dictionary*, 1991 ed., s.v. "Prerogative." (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991).

to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society."⁷ This definition will be followed in the analysis of the Indonesian military. The indicators for military prerogatives defined by Alfred Stepan are presented in Table 1. They can be used as a guide to determine the level of military prerogatives. A military prerogative is defined as high when the military has greater control of an area than the civilian authority. In an area that is controlled by civilian authority, the military has a low military prerogative. A moderate military prerogative is an area that is influenced by both the military and civilian authorities. The list is not exhaustive. I will only examine 8 of 11 items that relate to the Indonesian military prerogatives and contestations from the independence struggle in 1949 through Suharto's resignation in mid 1998. In addition, the determination of the level of military prerogatives will largely be subjective, with the levels being determined relatively over time.

⁷ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 93.

Table 1. Indicators for Military Prerogatives

FACTORS	LEVEL OF MILITARY PREROGATIVES		
	Low	Moderate	High
1. Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in political system	None	None	Military legally take actions to preserve law and order within the country.
2. Military relationship to the chief executive & its ability to mobilize armed forces.	Civilian leader is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he could mobilize the troops.	None	Military's leader able to mobilize forces independently, even without civilian authorization.
3. Active-duty military participation in the Cabinet.	Normally none.	Military's representation limited to professional areas, e.g., in defense and security.	Military's participation in areas other than defense and security.
4. Active-duty military participation in government.	None	None	Institutionalized. Assigned as member of MPR/DPR, local governors or civil leaders.
5. Role in intelligence	Controlled by civilians.	None	Controlled by military.
6. Role in police	Police force under civilian authorities.	None	Police force is part of the military.
7. Role in military promotion (officers).	Determined and approved by civilian leadership.	Determined by military leadership, approved by civilian leadership.	Determined and approved by military leadership.
8. Military role in acquisition.	Civilian authorities able to significantly influence military acquisitions.	Military determines necessary acquisitions, conducted after civilian approval.	Military determines and approves acquisitions.

Source: Author, based on Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94-97.

2. Military Contestations

Besides using military prerogatives, I will also use the concept of military contestations to measure the military's involvement in politics. I will examine the level of military contestation against the policies of the civilian democratic leadership. This is characterized by the extent to which there is intense dispute or substantial agreement between the military and the government concerning a number of key issues. For example, issues of potential conflict between the two institutions may concern military reaction toward the government's initiative vis-à-vis the organizational mission, structure and control of the military, and the military budget.⁸

The levels of military influence will largely be determined subjectively. One cannot merely count the number of military officers participating actively in political affairs to determine the levels, as the military is not always a homogenous entity but one riddled with factions that can be exploited by competent civilian politicians. The Indonesian military has always played a significant role in politics. This thesis will use the analysis of the prerogatives and contestations to determine the level of political participation. By examining the levels through the years, hopefully I can determine the trend and prove the thesis that the Indonesian military's political role has been declining in recent years, especially after Suharto resigned. Therefore, the Indonesian military should redefine its socio-political role in order to harmonize relations with Indonesian society in the future.

⁸ Ibid., 68.

II. HISTORY OF THE ARMED FORCES' SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE

ABRI takes pride in having sprung spontaneously from the masses. It was not created by civilian politicians, nor by the Dutch or Japanese. Armed bands gathered, elected their own officers, and fought the Dutch; all without the benefit of centralized political leadership or logistic support. Because of this, *ABRI* perceived itself less an instrument of the state than as a reflection of the will of the people. And since *ABRI* was built from the bottom up, it was difficult for the central government to enforce orders.⁹

To understand why the *TNI* is deeply involved in the social-political life of Indonesia, we have to look back at the history of the *TNI* and its role in Indonesia's struggle for its independence. The history of the *TNI*'s role in national life is inseparable from the history of Indonesia itself. Prior to the Second World War, the Dutch colonial masters of Indonesia did not attempt to widely assimilate the indigenous population into the defense of the archipelago. The colonial army in Indonesia, the *Koninklijk Nederland Indische Leger (KNIL)*, was mainly officered by the Dutch and the Eurasians and very few Indonesians became officers, with the highest rank attained by an Indonesian before 1940 being a major.¹⁰ While the Dutch recruited Indonesians as troops in the *KNIL*, most of them were from the Christian Indonesian areas of the eastern part of the archipelago. The Dutch also gave soldiers from these areas a substantially higher rate of pay than the relatively small number of Javanese, Sundanese, and other Indonesian soldiers in the *KNIL*. In addition, the Dutch officers often highlighted the disadvantages of a Javanese

⁹ Harold W. Maynard, "The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces", ed. Olsen E. A. and Jurika S. R.: *The Armed Forces in the Contemporary Asian Societies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 187.

¹⁰ Bilveer Singh, *Dwi Fungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces* (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 21.

dominated Indonesia to the Indonesian Christian soldiers.¹¹ Such Dutch attempts to fragment the indigenous Indonesians in the *KNIL* were largely successful. As such, one cannot consider the *KNIL* the cradle of the Indonesian military.

It was only during the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies during the Second World War that the nucleus of the Indonesian armed forces was formed. In October 1943, the Japanese occupation forces in Java created *PETA* (*Pembela Tanah Air* or Defenders of the Fatherland), an independent military force officered by Indonesians to assist the Japanese in repelling an Allied invasion of the archipelago. By the end of the war, *PETA* had some 37,000 men in arms in Java and 20,000 in Sumatra. In the further development in accordance with the policy and strategy of diplomacy, the national leaders made strenuous efforts to build an "image" of a peace-loving and democratic nation to the outside world, especially to the Allies. They were very much afraid to be called "militarist," "fascist," "extremist," and the like. That was the reason why they would not immediately form an army but only a *BKR* (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat* or People's Security Organization) which had a local character and indeed had only the task to keep order locally. The National Leadership realized that it was indeed impossible to have a government without an apparatus of power. Therefore, on October 5th, 1945 the formation of the People's Security Army or *TKR* (*Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*) as a regular army was decided. However, its socio-political role was not formed at the inception of

¹¹ George McTuman Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1959), 453.

the armed forces. These roles developed later during the independence revolution against the Dutch. This chapter will examine the Indonesian military's socio-political role, and will present a historical account of the development and implementation of these roles in the Indonesian society.

A. ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

What is meant by National Struggle in Indonesia is the struggle of the Indonesian nation to defend and to give substance to its Independence since the August 17, 1945 Proclamation. A military is a potent force. Its abilities to organize, train and lead in adverse conditions make it a valuable component in almost any struggle for independence; without the armed forces' support, the chances of success are drastically reduced. Regular military units often form the backbone in the conflicts, although most independence struggles also involve the use of irregular units, involving civilian militia forces or hastily trained civilian personnel in the fighting. In these instances, the regular military will normally take the lead in the armed struggles, bringing their expertise and equipment to the civilian population. Training and motivating the civilian population is crucial in developing a force capable of conducting armed struggles effectively. The military will also have to establish good relations with those under their charge, and this can be achieved by undertaking social projects. Thus, the military can play a significant social role in ensuring the success of the independence movement.

In addition, the chaotic situation and the uprooted society in post-independence situations often call upon the military to perform tasks above and beyond its war fighting duties. Recognizing its organizational abilities, the military often takes the lead or is

asked to take the lead in organizing political activities in support of the struggle. Determining the goals for the struggle, negotiating with the other parties, and setting the direction of and pace of the struggle are often undertaken by the military. Also, the military often has the final word in negotiations with the colonizers, or in determining the end of the independence struggle. Thus, a military's political roles often take root during the struggle for independence.

The Indonesian military's socio-political role evolved along the above pattern, and was not designed at a particular point of time by a higher authority. Through this evolution, these roles became legitimized and generally accepted in the Indonesian society.

B. ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE REVOLUTION

The Dutch East India Company (VOC) colonized Indonesia for more than 350 years, and the Japanese occupied Indonesia for about three and half years. Indonesia proclaimed its independence on August 17, 1945, just after the Japanese surrendered to Allied Forces in Indonesia on August 15, 1945. The national army was not established right after independence. However, a kind of armed organization was established, called *BKR* (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat* or People's Security Organization). The reason why Indonesia did not establish a regular army was to demonstrate its peaceful politics to the Allied Forces. On October 5, 1945, the Indonesian Army was established with its initial name *TKR* (*Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* or People's Security Army). A lot of the army members came from the Japanese organized *PETA* (*Pembela Tanah Air* or Defenders of the Fatherland). This newly born army was soon challenged by the arrival of the British

forces under the Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies Command (AFNEI). They brought with them elements of the Netherlands East Indies Civil Administration (NICA) which was to reestablish a colonial regime in Indonesia. Poorly trained, with insufficient military equipment, inexperienced soldiers were forced to fight against the Dutch troops in order to defend the Indonesian independence that it had just proclaimed. It was impossible for the Indonesian Army to fight the Dutch troops in conventional warfare. The Indonesian Army adopted guerrilla tactics, and fought hand-in-hand with the people. The struggle of the Indonesian Army in defending the Indonesian independence was political.¹² The Indonesian independence revolution against the Dutch colonizers lasted from 1945 to 1949. In this struggle, politics and military actions were often closely intertwined. The youths that joined the revolutionary forces in the independence struggle were motivated less by the desire for a military career than by national patriotism. In addition, the nature that the struggle eventually took also underscored the military's concern for political matters. During the independence struggle, the Indonesian government had very little central control over the fighting forces. For example, the revolutionaries in the Outer Islands had minimal contact with Java. These forces drew their strategies and their recruits on the basis of local social pressures and alignments, and these did not correspond faithfully to the forces at work on Java.¹³ However, the mode of fighting against the Dutch remained essentially the same throughout the archipelago.

¹² Department of Information, Directorate of Foreign Information Services, *Indonesia, an Official Handbook* (Jakarta: Perum Percetakan Negara, 1993).

¹³ Ruth McVery, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part I," *Indonesia*, no. 11 (April 1996), 142.

Inferior in its training and armaments compared to the Dutch professional army, the Indonesian revolutionary forces conducted guerilla warfare. This form of warfare drew heavily on support from the local population. The revolutionary forces acquired manpower and logistical requirements such as food and fuel from the civilians. In addition, the guerrilla fighters were organized into politically aligned units as well as regular army forces. The military leaders often had to perform political functions in order to rally these different political groups together and to obtain support for their independence cause. In many cases, the roles of the political and military leader became almost indistinguishable.¹⁴

1. The Beginning of the Socio-Political Role

Professionally trained officers are normally not politically inclined, as the duties of protecting the state against armed threats are assumed to be beyond politics. However, this professional tradition was absent in the Indonesian officer cadre during the independence struggle. While there were some Dutch-trained professional officers who had joined the nationalist side, the majority of the officers were recruited from the quick mobilization necessary to build a large fighting force. This larger group of officers received military training in auxiliary military organizations set up by the Japanese during the occupation (especially *PETA*); many others had taken up arms in local *laskar* or irregular units formed spontaneously throughout the country in the months after the

¹⁴ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 25.

proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945.¹⁵ The latter two groups of officers did not share the same ethics as those professionally trained officers, especially concerning the separation of politics and military. Thus, the absence of an apolitical military tradition made it easier for the officers to accept the political roles.

The circumstances under which military officers acquired the political orientation during the revolution gave them a sense of having their own political purposes that could differ from those of civilian politicians in the government. The military nature of the struggle inevitably involved the army leadership in national politics, where their views often conflicted with those of the civilian government. The government leaders, who had joined the nationalist movement during the 1920s and 1930s, came mainly from the urban, Dutch-educated elite, whereas the senior officers of the army were rarely more than thirty years old and usually came from the small towns of Java. They had been steeped in traditional culture, obtained only secondary schooling, and learned little Dutch. The lack of rapport that derived in part of this generation and cultural gap was exacerbated by the feeling of army officers in the field that they had at least as much right as civilian politicians in the government to decide how the struggle was to be pursued. For example in 1945, the first army commander, Colonel Sudirman, was selected by an intra-army election rather than appointed by the civilian leadership.¹⁶ Also, the army leaders often joined other political groups in expressing strong dissatisfaction with the government's readiness to offer concessions to the Dutch in the interests of a negotiated

¹⁵ Ibid., 25.

¹⁶ Benedict R. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-46* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972), 244.

settlement. The leaders of the government had perceived the struggle in its broader view of diplomatic retreats; these were regarded as betrayals by guerilla fighters, who were willing to risk their lives for nothing less than total victory.

2. The Armed Forces Political Role in Early Manifestation

One instance where the civilian leaders were considered betrayers of the Indonesian cause was the acceptance of the Linggarjati Agreement on 25 March 1947. This agreement resulted in the de facto recognition by the Dutch of Indonesia's sovereignty over Java, Sumatra and Madura, but not over the entire republic. This agreement was therefore seen by the Indonesian military as a violation of Indonesia's independence proclamation of 17 August 1945, which implied sovereignty over the whole territory of the Republic.¹⁷ The Indonesian people disapproved of this agreement, and demanded that the government make no concessions to the Dutch and only negotiate on the basis of 100 per cent *merdeka* (independence).¹⁸ Here, Sudirman defied the civilian leadership and advised his soldiers to struggle on regardless.¹⁹

Another example where the military opposed the civilian directions occurred in January 1948, when the civilian leaders signed the Renville Agreement with the Dutch. This occurred after the Dutch drove the republican forces out of Sumatra, eastern and

¹⁷ Soetjipto, H., Karamoy, W..A., Wuryani, M. S., et al., *Indonesia 1955: An Official Handbook* (Department of Information, Directorate of Foreign Information Service, Perum Percetakan Negara RI, 1994); available from <http://www.prica.org/indonesia/general/history.html>, accessed on 20 December 1999 by H. Haryono.

¹⁸ Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 305.

¹⁹ Anthony J.S. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution: 1945-50* (Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman Australia Pty. Limited, 1974), 96.

western Java, confining them to the region of central Java around Yogyakarta. The agreement stipulated a cease-fire and stopped the Dutch from capturing Yogyakarta, in return for the Indonesian recognition of the "van Mook line,"²⁰ and to withdraw republican forces from eastern and western Java. The military again felt betrayed and opposed this agreement. While some units followed the government's direction to withdraw, many units continued to occupy the easily defended guerrilla bases in Dutch-occupied territories in defiance of the agreement.²¹

The alienation of army officers from the government reached its peak when the army fought on after the leaders of the government (Sukarno, Hatta and half of the cabinet) had allowed themselves to be surprised and captured by the Dutch in December 1948.²² Many army officers were suspicious of the new round of negotiations that commenced in 1949. They rejected the cease-fire ordered by the government and felt cheated by the terms of the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949. Thus, by the end of the revolution, many army officers had become deeply distrustful of the civilian politicians who had led the government.²³

²⁰ This line connected the points of the most extensive Dutch inroads into the Indonesian republic's territory.

²¹ Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 234.

²² Ibid., 337-338.

²³ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 27.

3. Armed Forces Developments After the Revolution

After achieving independence in 1949, the military accepted civilian supremacy in ruling the country. However, the end of the revolutionary struggle did not mean a cessation of problems for the new republic. The political situation did not alleviate the strained situation upon independence. Instead of adopting the 1945 Constitution²⁴ that was perceived to be advocating a strongly authoritarian presidential regime, the civilian politicians adopted a more liberal democratic style of government. As such, a multi-party parliamentary system based on western political models was formed to win favor from the victorious Allies. In addition, many modern-educated Indonesians had learned from their Dutch mentors the idea that parliamentary democracy was a sign of maturity as a modern state.²⁵ But this style of governance proved highly unstable. Between 1950 and 1957, there were seven cabinets, each lasting about 15 months, and 100 political parties. As the civilian leadership became increasingly factionalized and ineffective in governing the nation, the Indonesian military became convinced that it bore the responsibility to intervene in order to "save" the nation. In this state of affairs, the conception of the army

²⁴ The 1945 Constitution was developed by Sukarno and the *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Body to investigate measures for the preparation of Indonesian Independence) or BPKI prior to the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945. It was influenced by Sukarno's *Pancasila* (Five Principles) ideology.

Sukarno's *Pancasila* ideology was first expounded in a speech to BPKI on 1 June 1945. It encompassed the following five principles:

- a. Belief in one and only God.
- b. Justice and civilized humanity.
- c. The unity of Indonesia.
- d. Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives.
- e. Social justice for the whole of the people in Indonesia.

²⁵ Ruth McVey, "Building Behemoth: Indonesian Construction of the Nation-State", ed. Daniel S. Lev., *Making Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1996), 18.

as an apolitical tool of the state quickly gave way to the older idea that the army was the guardian of the national interest and should intervene in political affairs whenever the weaknesses of civilian government made it necessary.²⁶

Events beginning in 1956 provided opportunities for the military to take a more prominent role in politics. The population deemed the Ali Sastroamidjojo government that was elected in 1956 as promoting only the interest of Javanese. This proved unpopular with those living outside Java, as they saw the government dominated by Javanese intent on "exploiting" the natural wealth of the export-producing areas. With the support of the local population, several regional and local commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi took control of local governments in defiance of the central government. Factionalism within the army also added to the chaotic nature of the period. Of significance was the Lubis Affair, which was a coup attempt by Colonel Zulkifli Lubis in 1956.²⁷ This turbulent atmosphere prompted Sukarno (with the support of the military) to declare the abandonment of liberal democracy and proclaimed a State of Emergency in April 1957. The military exploited the situation and expanded its influence into the economic and political spheres.²⁸ In 1959, Sukarno on the strong urging of the military re-instituted the 1945 Constitution. This provided Sukarno with substantial powers of the

²⁶ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 30.

²⁷ Lubis was a rival to the then Army Chief-of-staff, Major General Abdul Haris Nasution. When Nasution took steps to strengthen central army control over the regional army units, he and other officers whose posts were threatened began to organize the coup attempt. As part of the coup demands, Lubis did not call for the removal of Sukarno but declared that the president could be forced to accept the dissolution of political parties and the establishment of a military junta. See Ruth McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part I," *Indonesia*, no. 11 (April 1996), 157-171.

²⁸ McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part II," *Indonesia*, no. 13 (April 1996), 147.

state. This period, which lasted until 1965, became known as the "Guided Democracy" phase.

The military took full advantage of this period (1957-1965) not only to strengthen their political position but also to expand into the fields of general administration and economic management. The Army was given the additional task of managing newly traditionalized Dutch enterprises and agricultural estates, propelling the military into a position of economic influence. From 1957 to 1963, *Peperti* or Supreme War Administration was established. This was an army hierarchy that paralleled civilian territorial administration down to the local level and was responsible for administering the martial law on 1957. It provided a regular means for military intervention in civilian affairs at all levels. In the early years of the martial law, decisions made by *Peperti* were often more important than those taken by the civilian cabinet.²⁹ The only significant military representation in the 1959 cabinet was General Nasution, who became the Minister of Defense in addition to his position as the leader of the army.³⁰ At the regional level, the number of military officers appointed as provincial governors rose from 5 in 1960 to 12 out of 24 in 1965, including key provinces as Jakarta, West Java, and East Java.³¹ Military officers were also appointed as members of parliament at both the national and regional levels, and they were influential in the National Front set up by Sukarno to mobilize popular support for his political campaigns. The military's political

²⁹ Ibid., 151.

³⁰ Ibid., 150.

³¹ Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," ed. Zakaria Haji Ahmad & Harold Crouch, *Military-Civilian Relations in South East Asia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 57.

involvement did not diminish when Sukarno lifted martial law in 1963 or when Sukarno once again introduced a modified martial law in 1964 during the Confrontation with Malaysia.

4. The Formulation of the Dual Function

The *TNI* has conducted socio-political functions of influencing the government since the beginning of its history. This phenomena is against the western model of democracy which is based on Clausewitz' theory that war is but one way to achieve political goals. This implied that the military must be under civilian control or civilian supremacy. Based on this theory, the involvement of the military in politics is considered unconstitutional. That was not the case in Indonesia. The involvement of the military in Indonesia's political life was constitutional and legitimate, had a legal basis. Active military personnel, for example became ministers and governors.

To maintain legitimacy for its non-military roles, the Army Chief of Staff Major General Nasution formulated the concept of the "Middle Way" in 1958. According to him, the Indonesian army would not follow the Western model as a lifeless instrument in the hands of the government. On the other hand, it should not take over the government as this would only lead to coups and counter-coups as in cases in Latin America. Instead the military should tread the "Middle Way" participating in all areas of political and social life but not seeking to dominate the government.³² It would claim the right to continuous representation in the government, legislature and administration. However, it

³² Ibid., 59.

was not until April 1965 that the military formalized this political role in its first seminar, when it produced the doctrine on the Indonesian Armed Forces' *Dwi Fungsi* or "Dual Function." This "Dual Function" doctrine stipulated that the military has two functions, as a "military force" and as a "social-political force." As a "social-political force," the military would cover "the ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields."³³

5. Armed Forces Against the Indonesian Communist Party

By the early 1960s, the military had emerged as a credible and potent force in Indonesia's political arena. Because of the earlier experiences of civilian leadership (during the revolution for independence), the military still had a deep distrust of civilian leadership. As such, President Sukarno had to turn towards other organizations in Indonesia to garner grassroots support. Particularly, he cultivated the *Partai Komunis Indonesia—PKI* (Indonesian Communist Party). He recognized that the *PKI* was more able to mobilize mass support and more in fear of the army than the other parties, thereby making them the prime candidate for balancing against the power of the military.

Politically, the military already regarded the *PKI* as their main long-term rival and wanted to limit its potential for growth. Protected by President Sukarno, the *PKI* was permitted to continue as a legal party despite strong anti-Communist sentiments in the military. The *PKI* members held a substantial number of seats in the main representative legislative bodies. However, the *PKI* was unable to make inroads into the executive

³³ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 24.

positions of the cabinet.³⁴ Despite this, the Communist party remained an effective check for reducing the military's political powers. Its political clout expanded during Indonesia's conflict with the newly formed Malaysia—called *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation)—when it opted to take advantage of the sense of national invulnerability provided by the anti-Malaysian crusade to press its British and American interest in Indonesia, when the *PKI*-led unions took over a number of their plantations and enterprises. In addition, Sukarno banned its most vocal civilian critic, the Murba Party³⁵ in January 1965.³⁶ The *PKI* appeared to have gained an upper hand in politics over the military when President Sukarno announced in August 1965 that Indonesia was fostering an anti-imperialist Jakarta-Phnompenh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis.³⁷

6. The Coup of 1965: The Final Blow to Guided Democracy

By 1965 Sukarno's government was under severe social and political pressure. The rapid expansion of the *PKI* had created tensions among different factions of Islamic groups and within the armed forces. The *PKI* strongly influenced the government policies. Rivalry between the *PKI* and the military has moved the President (Sukarno) closer to the *PKI*, and the military's political power became stronger under the martial

³⁴ Ibid., 50.

³⁵ Murba Party was formed in 1948 by supporters of the "national-Communist" Tan Malaka. It was a rival party to the *PKI*. After the alignment of the *PKI* with the Chinese Communist Party in 1963, contacts were made between some elements in the *Murba* Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with a view to the *Murba* replacing the *PKI* in international communist bodies such as the World Federation of Trade Unions.

³⁶ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 66.

³⁷ Ibid., 67.

law which gave wide power to central army leadership and regional commanders to participate directly in government decision making process. Thus, during the Guided Democracy system, the armed forces increasingly played a direct role in government and administration. In other words, the military officers unambiguously entered the political elite. However, the *PKI* "supremacy" which was supported by Sukarno in politics over the military crashed in the aftermath of the abortive 1965 "coup." This "coup" was conducted by *Gerakan Tiga-Puluh September—G.30.S* (Thirtieth of September Movement) on the night of 30 September/1 October, with the main actions taking place in Jakarta and Central Java. Technically, this was not a coup in the normal sense; there was no intention to bring down the government. Instead, according to the leader Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, the action was designed to forestall a planned coup on 5 October by a "Council of Generals" against the President. The members of *G.30.S* seized and murdered six generals, including the army commander Lieutenant General Yani.³⁸

Major General Suharto, then the commander of *KOSTRAD* (the Army's Strategic Reserve Command), was able to crush the coup. There are several theories with regard to the true perpetrators of this coup. Some hypothesize that the "coup" was planned and conducted by disgruntled factions within the army and not by the *PKI*. However, the official army version at that time conveniently linked the *PKI* to the coup, and subsequently took steps to eradicate the communist party as a political force. Army-sponsored actions throughout the country arrested and killed active members of the *PKI*, while passive supporters were rounded up and sent to jails. While the army conducted

³⁸ Ibid., 97-99.

most of these actions, the military authorities also gave civilian anti-Communist organizations a fairly free hand in eliminating the communists. The total number of people killed in the aftermath of the coup remains unknown to date, with estimates ranging from 250,000 to 1 million killed.³⁹ The aftermath of the coup did not give a better hope for Sukarno. With the elimination of the *PKI* as his key source of strength, he was powerless in stopping the military from becoming even more entrenched in the Indonesian political scene. Nor could he prevent his own downfall in 1966. This landmark event signaled the end of the era of Guided Democracy. It also marked the demise of the *PKI* and the rise of Major General Suharto and the military in the political world. Their rise to power was in accord with Nordlinger's theory that "the military are often propelled into the political arena, and often remain there, when their countries are in the throes of violence and governmental instability."⁴⁰ Already, many of the military officers had become experienced politicians because of various factors such as the failure of the civilian politicians that forced the military to play a bigger socio-political role. Two decades of political involvement had honed their political skills. They were adept at negotiating, bargaining and compromising—essential skills for successful politicians. Their involvement in non-military activities in the preceding two decades had shaped a political style more suited to the advancement of officer's interests within the existing structure than to the creation of an entirely new political order. Thus, when the military strengthened its grip on the government after the "coup," it did not suddenly become the

³⁹ Ibid., 155-157.

⁴⁰ Eric A Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, 64:4, 1970, 1141.

bearer of new values and ideals but was more inclined towards the consolidation of power and the advancement of its existing interests.⁴¹

7. Armed Forces in the New Order Period

The new order under Suharto is marked by a basic difference in ideology from Sukarno's Guided Democracy. The New Order stressed stability and economic development, rather than the mass mobilization ideological confrontation that was characteristic of the Sukarno regime. Suharto faced three major problems after assuming full control, namely, (a) how to strengthen his position in the new political system, (b) how to decide on a political format for the "New Order", and (c) the critical issue of how to rehabilitate the devastated economy. Between October 1965 and March 1966, Suharto successfully limited Sukarno's power while at the same time strengthening his own position within the army and the army's position in relation to the president. Under the pretext of ensuring stability and order in Indonesia after the "coup," Suharto gradually took control of the army. On 16 October 1965, Sukarno was forced to appoint Suharto as the commander of the army. At the same time, Sukarno's powers gradually withered away. This period represented perhaps the high point of military ascendancy over the civilian leadership, and will be examined in detail in Chapter Three of this thesis. It should suffice to say here that the military prevailed over the civilian authorities, forcing Sukarno to relinquish most of his powers to Suharto on 11 March 1966. This paved the

⁴¹ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 67.

way for Suharto to formally assume the Presidential post in March 1968, and *Orde Baru* or the "New Order" began in Indonesia.

Unlike other military regimes, President Suharto did not adopt a bureaucratic-authoritarian form of government. Instead, he continued with the 1945 Constitution (which suited his authoritarian style of government) and reestablished Sukarno's *Pancasila* form of democracy in Indonesia. First, his New Order Government decreed that all political organizations would adopt the State Ideology, *Pancasila*, as their sole organizing principle. In addition, he limited the number of political players to three parties—the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP) or "United Development Party", the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI) or "Indonesian Democracy Party" and *Golongan Karya* (GOLKAR) or "Functional Groups."⁴² By adopting the 1945 Constitution, Suharto automatically remained as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces.⁴³ However, he was also careful not to portray an overly militaristic appearance, perhaps to downplay the military nature of his government in international and domestic eyes. However, Suharto maintained the prominence of the Armed Forces in the society through its socio-political role—he did not abolish the military's *Dwi Fungsi* concept postulated by General Nasution. He was careful to ensure that the military remained a minority in the cabinet.

⁴² The United development Party is a fusion of the Moslem Scholars Party, the Moslem Party, the Islamic Confederation and the Islamic Union.

The Indonesian Democratic Party is a fusion of the Nationalist Party, the Catholic Party, the Christian (Protestant) Party, the Indonesian Independence Party and the People's Party.

GOLKAR represents personnel not affiliated with either party, namely civil servants, retired members of the Armed Forces, women's organizations, professional groups, farmers, students, etc

⁴³ Article 10 of the 1945 Constitution: The President is the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

Even so, they remained relatively more powerful than the civilian majority, having the political backing of leading against the colonial to exercise real power. While the military wielded substantial influence in politics, it also sought to associate civilians of various types with it, partly to draw on their skills and experience, and partly to create a favorable image among Western aid donors. In 1966, the military expanded its participation in the civil service. Military personnel headed eleven out of 20 departments concerned with civilian affairs; 23 out of 64 director-generals were also military officers.⁴⁴ The military was also automatically allocated seats in the People's Representatives Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or *DPR*). Previously, 100 out of the 500 seats were assigned to the military, although this figure had declined to 75 in 1998.⁴⁵

The military was also dominant in regional administrations. In 1966, 12 out of the 24 provincial governors were military officers, including the important provinces of Jakarta, West Java and East Java. By 1968, this number rose to 16, and again increased to 22 out of the 26 in the 1971 elections. The military's political influence even reached to the lower levels of administration. By 1971, officers were appointed to about two-thirds of all the *bupatis* (district heads) and major positions in Indonesia.⁴⁶ The Indonesian military, through these political appointments, thus has a political influence in governing the various levels of the country.

⁴⁴ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 242.

⁴⁵ *Komposisi & Daftar Nama Anggota MPR: Komposisi Keanggotaan*, available at <http://mpr.wasantara.net.id/komposisi.htm>, accessed on 25 December 1999 by H. Haryono.

⁴⁶ Harold Crouch, *Military-Civilian Relations*, 61.

8. Armed Forces in Social Roles

The relationship between the Indonesian military, the state and the Indonesian society is best described by the military's doctrine (military basic strategy). According to this strategy, the Indonesian people will rise up and fight with the military against any threat to the independence and sovereignty of the nation. It calls for the mobilization of the entire national potential and assets to create the capabilities required to defend the security of the nation. Formally, this system is called *Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta* (in short Sishankamrata), or "People's Total Defense and Security." According to Indonesia's defense and security policy,⁴⁷ the Indonesian military will lead the resistance. Supporting the military will be the population and national infrastructure, who will enforce public order, provide emergency services, guarantee public security, and organize popular resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare.

This approach has shaped the roles the military has undertaken, its fighting strategies, ideals and expectations in relation to the state and the people. To succeed, this strategy demands close affiliation and cooperation between the military, the government

⁴⁷ *Indonesia's Defense and Security Policy*, available at [Http://www.abri.mil.id/index5/whitepre.htm](http://www.abri.mil.id/index5/whitepre.htm), accessed on 10 January 1999 by H. Haryono.

and the general public. Here, the army's "territorial" organization⁴⁸ serves well to develop this military-public rapport, with an army level of command corresponding to each of the functions of the civil government from the province right down to the village.⁴⁹

The military has to pursue a strong social role to achieve this rapport. As this duty is formally included as part of the *Dwi Fungsi* concept, the military can actively carry out social duties as part of its assigned tasks. These duties include the development of social infrastructure, and the improvement of the population's welfare. Through these social duties, the military has participated actively in nation building. The "territorial" organization of the army meant that the dispersion of forces throughout the country was necessary. This has contributed to the ease of carrying out social duties, as most of the army units are in position to assist the local government in developing the regions.

9. The Benefits and the Problems of the Armed Forces Socio-Political Role Involvement

The socio-political role has been formally accepted in the Indonesian society since the independence struggle. Even so, the military has to continue conducting

⁴⁸ The territorial organization of the military evolved over the years but gained momentum in the early 1960s as the army struggled to contain the growing influence of the *PKI*. 10 *KODAMs* or Military Area Commands are established in the archipelago, and each *KODAM* is further subdivided into *KOREM* (Military Region), *KODIM* (Military District) and *KORAMIL* (Military Subdistrict) in the territorial command structure. Using this structure, the army is able to reach out to the village level, as each *KORAMIL* commands an average of seven to eight villages. Territorial units are responsible for the defense and security of areas under their control. Even though the personnel in these territorial units are not necessarily raised from the local population, their influence is widely felt as these units often undertake operations to develop geographic, demographic and sociologic resources to improve the lifestyles of the population. Douglas Kammen & Siddharth Chandra, *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990's* (Cornell University: Ithaca, New York 1999).

⁴⁹ Bill Dalton, *Indonesia Handbook* 5th ed. (Chico, California: Moon Publication Inc., 1991), 18.

necessary actions to maintain its legitimacy. Some of these actions have benefited the Indonesian society, while others have stifled growth, especially in the political sectors. The following section will provide a short analysis on both the benefits and problems arising from the military's socio-political role.

a. Benefits

(1) The Armed Forces Entering the Villages. The Indonesian population has benefited from the active military socio-political involvement. One of the prime examples is the *ABRI (TNI) Masuk Desa* or "Indonesian Armed Forces Entering the Villages" program. This has been very successful in developing the infrastructure and amenities of the relatively backward villages. Through this program, the military built roads, canals and other social infrastructures. In addition, the military sometimes provides health care to the population. The Indonesian Armed Forces have played the role of a modernizer, while at the same time advancing their social and political standing in society.

(2) Transmigration. Apart from the *TNI Masuk Desa* program, the military also assisted the government in other social areas. For example, the navy provided transportation for people and material in the national "transmigration" program.⁵⁰ Through these successful programs, the military was able to present the image of a "caring military" to the ordinary population. The interaction between the military and society has also remained very close, resulting in some cases in a good rapport

⁵⁰ This program aims to spread the concentration of people from the populated areas of Java and Sumatra to the other reaches of the archipelago.

being built between the population and the military. The military thus hopes to rely on the population in times of need. In fact, local intelligence on the society is partly provided by the population itself.

(3) Economic Success. President Suharto had relied heavily on both the military's and technocrats' expertise to run the country and bring Indonesia out of the economic doldrums it had experienced since independence.⁵¹ To promote a healthy economic environment, he ensured that the Indonesian Armed Forces remained a professional fighting force capable of handling both internal and external threats. The degree of success can be seen on the domestic front where the Armed Forces (of which the Police is a component) was largely successful in curbing internal social unrest. However, Westerners have often criticized its approach to curbing such unrest as being excessively repressive. Nevertheless, it was the military that had ensured social and political stability, albeit at a very high cost in the number of lives lost during the turbulent years since independence. This high cost had allowed Indonesia to achieve significant economic progress since 1967.

b. Problems

(1) Political Repression. The greatest problem resulting from the military's intimate involvement in Indonesian politics is the repression of free speech and political activities.

⁵¹ Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, *Modern Indonesia: A History since 1945* (Singapore: Longman Singapore Publishers Ltd., 1995), 115.

By limiting the number of political parties, Suharto had effectively controlled the political directions and activities in Indonesia. In addition, the Armed Forces have been very effective in curbing political demonstrations under the general concern of ensuring stability within the country. In fact, critics of Indonesian politics contend that the Armed Forces were behind the ousting of Mrs. Megawati from the Chairmanship of the Indonesian Democratic Party, before the last general elections 1996. The restrictions appeared to have lifted somewhat in the ousting of Suharto as president. However, the continuing strong presence of the military in the political arena would still be an impediment towards complete political freedom and free speech.

The reports had also pointed out the certain members of *KOPASSUS* (Special Forces) were involved in the kidnapping of political activists during the May 1998 upheaval.⁵² At the moment, the identities of the main perpetrators are not clear, nor was the issue of whether these actions were ordered by civilian leaders to suffocate dissident opposition or by the military as attempts to maintain domestic stability. In any case, this represents another recent military intervention in domestic politics.

One cannot understate the importance of the military in politics. Without the tacit approval of the military, political changes cannot take place. For example, some reports stated that Suharto stepped down from the presidential post after

⁵² "7 soldiers arrested for kidnapping, *The Straits Times Interactive*, available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea6_0915.htm, accessed on 15 July 1998; "Soldier to be court-martialled, *The Straits Times Interactive*, available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea6_0816.htm, accessed on 16 July 1998 by H. Haryono.

the military had delivered an ultimatum that forced him to resign.⁵³ In reality the civilians (generally mass of students) demonstrated and forced Suharto to resign. General Wiranto also had to voice support for the President Habibie (before he was the vice president), before the latter could be credibly accepted in the society or by the military, which had long held him in great contempt.

(2) Corruption. The strong political and social roles played by the military inevitably led to a deep involvement of the military in the economic sector. Many businessmen sought their assistance in influencing events in their favor. Commanders and staff officers may be able to help the businessmen obtain contracts, licenses or permits to conduct particular commercial activities. They may also assist in resolving land disputes, calming labor disputes (often by strong-arm tactics), overcoming bureaucratic obstacles, relocating squatters and so on. Many businessmen, especially those of Chinese origin, find it prudent to keep the local military on their side against the day when social unrest might threaten their lives or property.⁵⁴ However, such influences did not come free and financial remuneration was the order of the day. This led to widespread corruption in the military, and added to the cost of conducting business in Indonesia. Indonesia has the dubious distinction of being one of the most corrupt nations

⁵³ "Did military tell Suharto to step down?" *The Straits Times Interactive*, available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea4_0845.htm, accessed on 23 may 1998 by H. Haryono.

⁵⁴ Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1996), 141.

in Asia. In 1997, the organization "Transparency International" ranked Indonesia as the 6th most corrupt country out of 85 countries surveyed.⁵⁵

(3) Limited Development of Social Organizations. Suharto's regime often viewed non-governmental organizations with suspicion, especially those with international links. As such, Suharto had used the military effectively to prevent the growth of such organizations. In addition, the military's superior organizational skills, and extensive use of personal and widespread influence in Indonesia's social arena overshadowed any efforts by fledgling social organizations. As a result, the perennial presence of the military in the social arena severely stunted the development of non-governmental social organizations. In the post-Suharto era, the country is effectively denuded of indigenous non-governmental organizations that can lead and rally the people effectively, and this will complicate the internal situation if the military were to suddenly withdraw its participation in the social scene.

10. Summary

The involvement of the Indonesian military in the social and political arena is historically rooted. This involvement has been legitimized by the military's actions in the independence struggle and by the formal *Dwi Fungsi* declaration. While this socio-

⁵⁵ "The Corruption Perceptions Index," *Transparency International & Dr. Johann Graf Lambsdorff*, 1997, available at <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html>, accessed on 25 September 1998 by H. Haryono.

political role had assisted in the development of Indonesia since independence, it had also stifled progress in certain sectors, particularly in the areas of free speech and true democracy. However, the military did not always play this role as freely as it could. Civilian leaders had made attempts to marginalize the military's influence in politics, some successfully, others less so. This ebb and flow and in general a decline of the military's socio-political influences in recent years will be examined in the following chapter.

III. DECLINING OF THE ARMED FORCES' SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE INFLUENCES

We know we have to work with Abri [sic] if we are to achieve a transition of power but we are worried that the army will take over again once Suharto is gone....Right now we have a common cause with Abri, just like we did in 1965-66. But can we carve out enough space for ourselves so that Abri won't take it all away once their objective has been reached? This is what they did in the late 1960s and I'm afraid they could do it again. If that is going to happen, what's the point of trying to push out Suharto?⁵⁶

A. THE CHANGING LEVELS OF THE ARMED FORCES POLITICAL ROLE

Chapter II already described the formalization of the Indonesian military's socio-political role. In the military's view, its actions both prior to and immediately after the chaotic independence period justified and legitimized these extensive roles in Indonesian society. However, not all sectors in the society accepted these roles for allowing the military to be especially involved in politics. There were always attempts by the civilian elites to decrease these roles, to reduce the influences of the military, and to limit the organization to its professional duties.

This chapter will analyze the level of the military's socio-political influences. As detailed in Chapter I, the method to be used is a comparison over time of events that demonstrate the levels of military prerogatives and contestations and will indicate the level of military influences in non-military affairs. Historical events in Indonesia in

⁵⁶ In the words of Arief Budiman, quoted in Douglas Kammen and Siddharth Candra, *A tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990s* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 80.

which the military had challenged the civilian politicians will be studied to determine both the type and intensity of these contestations. Analysis of these events demonstrates that the military enjoyed the highest political influence towards the end of Sukarno's rule in the 1960s, and this level gradually diminished during Suharto's reign. The result of this analysis, therefore, goes against prevailing thoughts that the military greatly benefited from Suharto's rule by expanding its domination of the Indonesian society.

B. BEGINNING OF THE ARMED FORCES PREROGATIVES AND CONTESTATIONS

1. Prerogative Over Appointments

During the independence struggle, different factions of the armed forces-*PETA*, *Laskjar* (irregular units) and *KNIL* the Dutch-trained Indonesian army officers and men,⁵⁷ among others-were loosely bonded by the common goal of *perjuangan* (struggle). Local administrative chiefs controlled these forces, rather than the *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* (*BKR* or People's Security Organization), to organize these revolutionary forces.⁵⁸ After Sukarno proclaimed Indonesia independence on August 17, 1945 he then attempted to exert central control over the revolutionary forces. In October 1945 Sukarno proclaimed the formation of *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* (*TKR* or People's Security Army), designed to amalgamate all the revolutionary forces under the control of the cabinet. *TKR* represented the first army high command of the Indonesian military, even though in reality this high command still had little influence and control over the regional forces.

⁵⁷ Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 101.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 103-104.

As it turned out, civilian control over *TKR* proved almost impossible. For example, military leaders rather than civilian leaders decided upon the appointment of Sudirman as *Panglima Besar* (loosely translated as "Commander-in-Chief") of the revolutionary forces in November 1945.⁵⁹

The military again exercised its prerogative in determining its leadership in June 1955. Then, the coalition government led by the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (*PNI*) or the Indonesian National Party appointed Major General Bambang Utojo, a *PNI*-sympathetic but relatively junior officer, as the army chief-of-staff. Officers of both the major factions of *BKR* and *TKR*, the former Indonesian military joined to reject the appointment. Major General Bambang Utojo resigned and this resulted in the dissolution of Ali Sastro Amidjojo's cabinet on July 24, 1955. As a result, the government was humiliated in that it could not control the military and soon fell from office. Since that time the Indonesian military has been recognized as a socio-political force. This situation also produced an atmosphere of self-confidence in the army, and officers became convinced that they could have far more political influence in the future.⁶⁰ The exercise of military prerogative in determining its own leadership would surface repeatedly throughout Indonesia's modern history. While not all the attempts were successful, the military nevertheless managed to intervene successfully in crucial times.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 232-244.

⁶⁰ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 31.

2. Contestation Over Organization

The political leaders were eager to assert civilian control over the armed forces over fears that militarism or fascism would arise in Indonesia. The Sjahrif and Sjarifuddin cabinets (1945-1947) introduced a political commissar system into the army. This was primarily instituted through *Staff PePolit* (Political Education Staff) and *Biro Perjuangan* (the Struggle Bureau), established in the Ministry of Defense. The former aimed to indoctrinate and control the army and the latter was a coordinating body for guerrilla activities against the Dutch. The governments also backed revolutionary units that seemed more sympathetic to them rather than to the army high command. For example, they established *laskjar* (irregular units) to fight the Dutch to balance against the recalcitrant army high command.⁶¹ These represented some of the first attempts that the civilian leadership undertook to control the military.

The army high command quickly crushed these initial attempts by the Indonesian civilian leadership. The military was assisted by the conservative Hatta administration of 1948 that also endeavored to dismantle the leftist institutions established by the previous two regimes-the same institutions that had attempted to control the military. Hatta also forged an alliance with the military whereby the latter agreed to support government's policies in return for civilian non-interference in its affairs. As a result, the *laskjar* forces and army units deemed as disloyal to the central command were dismantled in the name of retrenchment and rationalization.

⁶¹ McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part I," 136.

The subsequent Madiun Affair of September 1948 further provided the military with a reason for advocating civilian non-intervention in its affairs. The Madiun Affair was an armed confrontation between the communists and the conservatives, where communist-influenced army personnel supported a coup attempt by the communists. Specifically, Brigade 29, formerly the *Biro Perjuangan*, captured and killed the leading pro-government officers in Madiun.⁶² The high command claimed that the incident was a result of civilian influence within the military as it was the army institutions set up by the leftist Sjahrif and Sjarifuddin cabinets that instigated this incident. It gave the military leaders an excellent argument to use whenever, in subsequent years, political leaders again tried to engineer devices for civilian control of their forces.⁶³

3. Failure of Military Contestation

Not all military contestations or seeking of prerogatives against civilian authorities were successful during this period. One instance was the 17 October 1952 Affair, which began with an attempt by the civilian leadership to determine the composition of the army high command. In particular, it demanded the dismissal of Ali Budiardjo (secretary general of the Ministry of Defense), Major General T.B. Simatupang (Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces) and Colonel A.H. Nasution (Army Commander). To the army high command, this represented the kind of civilian interference that the military could not overlook if it were to preserve the autonomy essential to its role as

⁶² Reid, Anthony J.S. *Indonesian National Revolution: 1945-50* (Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman Australia Pty Limited, 1974), 142.

⁶³ McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part I," 137.

guardian of national independence. To safeguard its position, the military surrounded the presidential palace on 17 October, where they then demanded the dissolution of the parliament.

Sukarno at that moment agreed to the military's demands, but later reneged on his promises. He and the political parties set about working for the destruction of the high command. He was successful in portraying the coup leaders as unpatriotic and therefore with no legitimate rights to their posts. Sukarno and his supporters were also able to sway elements within the military to conduct intra-military coups, removing commanders who had favored the army leadership. He removed Ali Budiardjo, Simatupang and Nasution, and dissolved Simatupang's former office of Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces, thereby allowing civilians to promote inter-service rivalry as an instrument of their control.⁶⁴ For example, Sukarno appointed Colonel Bambang Utojo from *PNI* to become the army chief-of-staff. Thus, the 17 October 1952 Affair represented a failure in military contestation with the civilian leadership. However, it did not characterize a downturn in the military's political fortunes. Valuable lessons learnt from this event helped shape future military-civilian interactions. Particularly, Nasution, who would again come into power after 1955, realized that one should not confront Sukarno directly and that the army's cause was best served by pursuing its goals in such a way as to avoid

⁶⁴ See Simatupang's account of these affairs in T.B. Simatupang, *Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People's War*, trans. Benedict Anderson and Elizabeth Graves (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972), 63.

a direct challenge.⁶⁵

In summary, this period (from 1945 to the mid-1950s) is characterized by the initial attempts by the military to assert itself against civilian control. While some of the prerogatives and contestations that the military attempted were successful, others were less so. The disunity in the military also prevented it from adopting a higher political profile, as adept leaders like Sukarno could exploit the fractures within the military. In addition, the scope of most of these military initiatives against civilian control was limited, directed towards the determination of the military organization and not against the political directions of the state.

C. SUPERIORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE OLD ORDER

The defining moment for the military's deep involvement in the social and political arenas appeared to be in 1957. Specifically, the declaration of a State of Emergency in 1957 and the establishment of *Peperiti* (Supreme War Administration, 1957-1963) provided the legitimacy for the military to rapidly expand its influence in all sectors of Indonesian society. The levels of military prerogatives and contestations did not diminish in the following years when Sukarno introduced his own brand of administration during the Guided Democracy years. Initially, Sukarno relied heavily on the military for support, but he was also well aware that a military strongly entrenched in politics would be a potent challenger to his rule. From 1959 to 1965, he sought to limit the military's political influence. In addition to exploiting rivalries within the military, he

⁶⁵ McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part I," 143-150.

cultivated and obtained support from civilian groups to balance the powers of the military. The most important and most powerful of these groups was the communist *PKI*. Thus, the military in this period faced strong opposition in exercising its prerogatives and contestations against civilians. However, events demonstrated that the military successfully faced the civilian leadership in most cases, and ultimately culminated in removing of Sukarno from his presidential post in 1966.

1. Improved Military Unity

One of the reasons why the military was successful in pursuing its socio-political goals in this period was that it had become more integrated and united after the Lubis Affair in 1956. Nasution (the Army Chief-of-Staff) was able to use this incident to remove many dissident officers in the army. He was further able to consolidate central control over military units after suppressing the 1958 rebellions, thereby improving the unity of the military.⁶⁶ The military thus became stronger as a result of these events, able to effectively assert itself against the civilian leadership.

⁶⁶ After the failed coup attempt by Colonel Lubis, several regional and local commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi took control of local governments and succeeded in rallying considerable popular support against the central government. By 1958, the crisis had turned into open rebellion, when the dissidents garnered civilian political support to set up the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*PRRI*) in West Sumatra. The military under Nasution was able to suppress this rebellion by playing off military factions within rebel commands and by presenting a prompt and credible show of central forces in the dissident areas. See McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part I," 174-176; Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 33.

2. Appointments

a. *Political Representation*

One of the most direct and most visible political gains by the military was the appointment of General Nasution to the post of *Menhankam* (Minister of Defense and Security) in 1959. This was the first significant cabinet post headed by an active-duty military leader, as Nasution then still held the position of army commander. This marked the army leadership's establishment of a principle for which it had struggled from the very beginning of the revolution and which had previously been denied by Indonesia's civilian governments-direct representation in the political apparatus.⁶⁷ Military representation throughout the country increased after Sukarno appointed Nasution to the cabinet post. At the regional level, the number of military officers appointed as provincial governors rose from 5 in 1960 to 12 out of 24 in 1965, including the key provinces of Jakarta, West Java, and East Java.⁶⁸ Military officers were also appointed as members of parliament at both the national and regional levels, and they were influential in the National Front set up by Sukarno to mobilize popular support for his political campaigns.

The military also sponsored a series of mass organizations to extend its political influence. This began with the "National Front for the Liberation of West Irian" in 1958. In addition, the military also broadened its political base by establishing *Badan Kerjasama* (Cooperative Bodies) with the aim of detaching from the declining

⁶⁷ McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part I," 150-151.

⁶⁸ Harold Crouch, *Military-Civilian Relations*, 57.

conservative parties their affiliated peasant, worker, youth, woman and other organizations. This was important not only to protect the military from accusations of undemocratic behavior, but also to give the military a broader influence in the National Council. The military was only one functional group amongst many in the National Council, but by influencing the leadership of other functional groups, it could create for itself a significant block of support in the Council.⁶⁹

b. Military Appointments

The military had gained an important post in the cabinet, but it was not totally free from civilian supervision. Sukarno continuously attempted to reduce the powers of the military and individuals within the military. For example, he was able to outmaneuver Nasution during the 1962 military leadership reshuffle and drastically reduced the latter's powers. In this episode, Sukarno offered Nasution the new post of *Pangab* (*Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata* or Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces) with full authority over all four services provided Nasution relinquished his command over the army. Nasution probably agreed to be "promoted" so that the army could reassert its hegemony over the other services. The new post would also reinsured Nasution's position as *Menhankam* which he would continue to occupy after the 1962 leadership reshuffle. However, Sukarno apparently secured the support of Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dani (Chief-of-Staff, Air Force) and Police General Sukarno Joyonegoro (Chief-of-Staff, Police), who protested on behalf of their services against being commanded by an army

⁶⁹ Stephen Sloan, *A Study in Political Violence: The Indonesian Experience* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1971), 79.

officer. As a result, Sukarno was able to exploit this and altered Nasution's planned promotion to the largely administrative post of *Kasab* (*Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata* or Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces).⁷⁰ Sukarno had hoped that such a move would remove Nasution from immediate control of the army and supply an alternate focus for military loyalties. Sukarno had also expected that there would be dissension in the army with the promotion of Achmad Yani as the army commander. Yani was a relatively junior general and Sukarno had hoped that he might be weak enough in his new office to remain dependent on presidential support. However, Yani proved to be sufficiently adept at army politics to overcome much of the resentment at his premature promotion. He was also aware of the disadvantages of breaking with the Nasution camp. As such, while Yani assumed a more cooperative public stance towards the civilian leadership, he essentially remained opposed to Sukarno's camp.⁷¹ In a sense, then, the military was able to limit Sukarno's attempts to control the military.

c. Reorganization of Koti (Supreme Operations Command)

Sukarno moved swiftly to contain the military at the end of martial law in 1963. He reorganized the military's operational commands by dissolving *Peperti* (Supreme War Administration) while retaining *Koti* (*Komando Operasi Tertinggi* or Supreme Operations Command), which was also formed during the martial law to prevent Nasution's Defense Ministry from gaining its powers. Sukarno also ensured that

⁷⁰ C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985), 156-157.

⁷¹ McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part II," 152-153.

the army did not dominate the new *Koti*-army officers headed only two of the five divisions. He appointed the foreign minister, Subandrio, to be in charge of intelligence; the minister of information, Achmadi, became responsible for "mobilization;" and Air Commodore Sri Muljono Herlambang headed the division of operations. With broad and general functions, *Koti* became more important than the cabinet. The main cabinet ministers, including Nasution, became members of its Advisory Council, and many important government decisions were taken at its sessions.

It would appear that Sukarno had some success at reducing the military's ability to conduct political prerogatives and contestations against civilians. However, it was more likely that the military allowed Sukarno's advances. Under Achmad Yani, the army was prepared to cooperate with the president, but its cooperation was dependent on Sukarno not adversely affecting the balance of power. As long as the army could preserve its basic interests and *PKI* did not make significant advances politically, the army leadership was willing to tolerate minor changes that did not reduce its position as the most powerful organized force.⁷² While Sukarno could challenge and outmaneuver the military, he nevertheless could not forge an army leadership subservient to him.

3. Military Control Over its Budget

Another area of contestation between the military and the civilian authorities was the control over the military budget. The first opportunity for the military to partly control its own budget came in late 1957 when nationalist demonstrators seized all

⁷² Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 55.

Dutch-owned enterprises in Indonesia following an adverse vote on West Irian in the United Nations. The military immediately used its martial law powers to place all Dutch enterprises under military supervision, and its involvement remained even after the nationalization of these enterprises.⁷³ It appointed officers to managerial and supervisory posts in government enterprises, and this provided the institution with substantial sources of funding outside the regular government budget.

The Cold War also provided an additional boost that strengthened the military's control over their own budget. Indonesia was able to obtain aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union as these two superpowers courted Indonesia. Particularly, the Soviet Union provided substantial aid to Indonesia, and transferred a large amount of heavy equipment-modern ships and airplanes-to the military.⁷⁴ These opportunities thus enabled the military to reduce civilian control over its budget, thereby providing an avenue for the military to demonstrate a high level of contestation with civilians when required.

4. The Military and its Influence on the *PKI*'s Development

Sukarno began to cultivate the *PKI* in 1960 as a counterbalance to the military's growing political strength. He felt that the communist organization would provide him with more grassroots support for his rule. The military on the other hand regarded the *PKI* as their main long-term rival and wanted to limit its potential for growth. However,

⁷³ Ibid., 38-39.

⁷⁴ McVey, "Post-Revolutionary transformation: Part II," 157.

Sukarno was able to neutralize some of the military's attempts to marginalize the *PKI*, although he was aware of the depth of anti-Communist sentiment generally prevalent in the military. Protected by the president and contained by the military, the *PKI* soon became a key factor in the Indonesian balance of power. Sukarno allowed the *PKI* to remain as a legal political party, and its members subsequently held a substantial share of seats in the main representative bodies. He accorded its leaders, Aidit and M.H. Lukman, ministerial status as deputy chairmen of *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara* (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) and *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong* (Mutual Assistance People's Representative Council) respectively, but the *PKI* continued to be excluded from cabinet post holding executive powers.⁷⁵ Here, the military exhibited a high level of contestation in civilian politics. Even with the substantial communist support, Sukarno was still not able to elevate the *PKI* to a higher political presence for fear of military opposition. The potential of the military to interfere in politics had thus placed some limitations and inhibitions on the development of politics in Indonesia since the 1960s.

⁷⁵ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 48-51.

5. Confrontation Against Malaysia

The military's attitude towards the pursuance of *Konfrontasi* ("Confrontation") against Malaysia⁷⁶ denoted the deepening level of military contestation against the civilian relationship. The military leaders were unenthusiastic, especially General Nasution as the Chief-of-Staff of the Indonesian Armed forces and General Achmad Yani as army commander, they were not allowed to send the troops to Sarawak against Malaysia. However, they continued to follow Sukarno's instruction in conducting low-level infiltration and conflicts as long as the conflict did not escalate into a real war. In fact, they viewed this as a good opportunity to strengthen the military's political position as well as gain new armaments and equipment. But, they began to undermine Sukarno's policies when he decided to escalate the conflict in 1964 to an invasion of Malaysia.

a. *Komando Siaga and Komando Mandala Siaga*

The military leadership saw the establishment of *Koga* (*Komando Siaga* or Vigilance Command, the body responsible for controlling the operations against Malaysia) as a move to reduce their capacity to restrain the military side of the campaign. The commander of the air force, Air Marshal Omar Dani, headed *Koga*.

The army considered him to be a Sukarno loyalist and therefore not to be relied upon to abide by the military's inclinations during *Konfrontasi*. As such, the

⁷⁶ Malaysia's decision to incorporate Sabah and Sarawak (in present East Malaysia) into the Federation was not accepted by Indonesia. A decision was taken by both countries to request a United Nations mission to ascertain the wishes of the people in those areas. Following only brief hearings with local politicians, the UN mission concluded that the "majority" wanted to join Malaysia. These conclusions were immediately denounced by Indonesia. Taking the view that Malaysia was a "British project" designed to create a "Puppet state" to perpetuate neocolonialism, Indonesia launched *Konfrontasi*, a campaign that began with low-scale incursions into both Malaysia and Singapore.

military was compelled to conduct a subtle contestation against Sukarno to redress the situation. The army leadership persuaded Sukarno to accept a military reorganization of the fighting forces into the *Kolaga* (*Komando Mandala Siaga* or Mandala Vigilance Command) structure,⁷⁷ so that the military leaders, instead of Sukarno and his trusted officers, could exercise a large controlling influence over the operations.

The army leadership also selected Brigadier General Idris to head the invasion forces in Sumatra. Idris was a long-time opponent of Sukarno and his decision to conduct the *Konfrontasi* operation, and the army leaders were confident that he would not conduct any invasion of Malaysia without the army's consent. The military also took various steps to forestall Sukarno's invasion attempts. Firstly, Idris was able to delay the transfer of invasion troops to Sumatra. In addition, the army planners for the invasion ensured that the preparations did not reach an advanced stage by not supplying the means of crossing the straits. These deliberate attempts ensured that the invasion of Malaysia remained just a plan.⁷⁸ During the confrontation against Malaysia especially the army was disloyal to Sukarno because, he appointed Air Marshal Omar Dani (the Air Force Chief-of-Staff) as the leader of *Koga* or Vigilance Command not Suharto or Ahmad Yani, both of them were the army leaders.

⁷⁷ *Koga* was replaced by *Kolaga*. This *Mandala* concept meant that the *Kolaga* had authority over all troops from all four services within the area of its command but no authority outside the area. For *Konfrontasi*, *Kolaga* had authority over Sumatra and Kalimantan but not over Java. The explicit imitation of the authority meant that it could not mobilize troops from Java but had to request forces from the service commanders. See Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 71.

⁷⁸ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 72-73.

b. Military Prerogatives on Command Appointments

While the military leadership could not prevent Sukarno from appointing Air Marshal Omar Dani as the head of *Koga*, it was able to influence other key appointments. The appointment of Brigadier General Kemal Idris was instrumental in the military's plans to hinder Sukarno's execution of the *Konfrontasi* campaign. Even the appointment of Brigadier General Supardjo, a leftist officer completely committed to the president, to head the forces in Kalimantan was negated by the military's choice of the lower echelon commanders. The interregional commander for Kalimantan, Major General Maraden Panggabean, and the West Kalimantan commander, Brigadier General Ryacudu, were army loyalists. The army was also able to replace the left-leaning East Kalimantan commander, Brigadier General Suharjo, with Brigadier General Sumitro.⁷⁹ Here, the military again demonstrated a high level of prerogative in shaping appointment changes that would serve their interests.

c. Military's Contestation in Foreign Affairs

Sukarno's decision to land infiltrators in West Malaysia on 17 August and again on 2 September 1964 greatly disturbed the military leadership. It decided to develop secret contacts with the Malaysia and English leaders to inform them that the Indonesian army was not supporting the expansion of the conflict. By doing so, the Indonesian military hoped to reduce the risks of the confrontation campaign while continuing to go through the motions of supporting it.⁸⁰ Achmad Yani was a prime mover

⁷⁹ Ibid., 73.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 74-75.

for initiating these contacts, and he was able to prevent the conflict from being escalated to a full scale of war.⁸¹ This decision to bypass civilian authorities in contacting the Malaysian leaders represented a high level of military contestation against Sukarno, for this effort seriously undermined the entire *Konfrontasi* campaign.

d. Military Prerogative and Contestation During Old Order

The military during Sukarno era in *Orde Lama* or Old Order did not confine its attention to military affairs only. It was able to achieve some success in determining its military leadership and organizational changes, and even able to obtain a certain degree of control over its budget during this period. Far more significant were the military's attempts to exercise its prerogatives and contestations beyond the military boundaries. The military's active participation in politics began in this period with the appointment of Nasution as the *Menhankam*, and the formal appointment of other active officers to governmental and regional civilian post. In addition, civilian leaders began to factor in the military's potential reactions when deciding the political landscape of Indonesia. However, the *Konfrontasi* campaign probably demonstrated that the Indonesian military had matured into a credible and effective domestic political instrument. *Konfrontasi* demonstrated that the military was not subservient to Sukarno's politics. Instead, it had illustrated the military's willingness and capabilities to contest civilian political decisions when they diverged from the military's interests. While the military leaders were not able to reject the president's policies openly, they nevertheless

⁸¹ Julius Pour, *Benny Moerdani: Profil Prajurit Negarawan* (Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993), 317-320.

successfully undermined the civilian authorities throughout the campaign. Such a level of prerogatives and contestations represented a leap from the non-military roles the military had undertaken between 1945 and 1957.

D. THE PEAK OF MILITARY CONTESTATION

The 1965 "coup" marked another landmark in the development of the military's socio-political role. The military exploited this incident to strengthen its political position vis-à-vis the other two parties in the power balance-Sukarno and the *PKI*. Here, the military probably exercised its highest levels of prerogatives and contestations against the civilian leadership. Two key army officers shaped the military's responses-Nasution and Suharto. They were the most senior officers in the army remaining after the coup, and they took a more belligerent stance towards Sukarno and the *PKI* compared to the previous Yani administration.

1. Military Prerogative in Leadership Changes

The military under Suharto demonstrated a high level of prerogative immediately after the "coup" on 1 October 1965. As General Achmad Yani, the army commander was missing due to being kidnapped and killed by the *PKI* on the night of 30 September 1965 coup, Suharto took the independent decision to assume the leadership of the army. The senior generals in Jakarta who could be contacted agreed to Suharto's initiative. In addition, he assumed control over the naval and police forces in Jakarta.⁸² Here, Suharto

⁸² Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 130.

did not rely on civilian consent to legitimize his appointment as head of the army, but depended on the support of the military to sanction his action.

The army leadership further contested the decisions of the civilian leadership in the aftermath of the "coup." In a direct confrontation with the president, Suharto and Nasution refused to recognize Sukarno's appointment of Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro as the army commander. Their refusal forced Sukarno to compromise; Sukarno (in his capacity as Supreme Commander) took formal command of the army while appointing Pranoto to carry out the "daily task" of the commander, but only on the condition that Sukarno gave Suharto the responsibility for the "restoration of security and order."⁸³ In addition, Suharto refused to abide by Sukarno's appeals to limit the retribution to those directly involved, resulting in the killing of thousands of the *PKI* supporters and the elimination of the *PKI* as a political party.

The military also demonstrated a high degree of prerogative in pressuring Sukarno on the issue of leadership changes within the military. Consequently, Sukarno bowed to pressure and appointed Suharto as the army commander and chief-of-staff of *Koti* on 16 October. The military leadership under Suharto also forced him to dismiss the air force commander, Omar Dani.⁸⁴

2. Military Prerogative in Organizational Initiatives

The military's prerogatives and contestations against civilian authority intensified

⁸³ Ibid., 137.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 161.

when Suharto established *Kopkamtib* (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* or Operations Command to Restore Order and Security) on 10 October to institutionalize the authority granted by Sukarno. *Kopkamtib* allowed Suharto to have operational control and command of military resources to conduct the security operations, providing him the de facto powers of the army commander.⁸⁵

Suharto further consolidated his powers by reorganizing *Koti* in late November. He removed the two civilian heads-Subandrio and Achmadi-and Air Vice Marshal Sri Muljono as he considered them to be Sukarno's loyalists. By doing so, he removed all vestiges of Sukarno's control of this organization.⁸⁶ Suharto was also successful in establishing *Mahmillub* (*Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa* or Special Military Court) to try leading prisoners from the 1 October coup. He also assumed the liberty to appoint the judges in such courts and to determine who would be brought to trial.⁸⁷ Suharto's successes demonstrated a high level of military prerogative in deciding organizational establishments and changes.

3. Military Prerogative in Eliminating the Indonesian Communist Party

Sukarno's refusal to publicly announce the dissolution and the banning of the *PKI* brought him into conflict with the military. Again, the military demonstrated a high level of contestation against Sukarno when the West Java commander, Major- General Ibrahim Adjie unilaterally "dissolved" the *PKI* in his area on 17 November 1965. Regional

⁸⁵ Ibid., 160-161.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 161.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

commanders throughout the nation followed his actions, even though no civilian directions were given to pursue such initiatives.⁸⁸ The subsequent massacre of the *PKI* supporters, conducted mainly by civilian anti-Communist organizations such as Moslem organizations, decimated its ranks and eradicated it as a political party. Ironically the military did not stop the massacre. Some estimates put the number of the *PKI* supporters killed at 1 million. Here, the inaction on the part of the military in not preventing the massacre proved to be crucial in the eradication of the *PKI*, its main political rival. Thus, through both actions and non-actions, the military had successfully contested and changed Indonesia's political environment.

4. The Disguised Coup of 11 March 1966

Despite the high level of military prerogatives and contestations against Sukarno in the beginning of 1966, the military still avoided ousting Sukarno from the presidential post and assuming direct political power. This would allow the military to escape from the charge of destroying the nation-state's symbol of legitimacy that had for so long been vested in Sukarno. As one observer noted, "To ensure the long-term legitimization of the decimation of a political rival, the army needed the sanction of Indonesia's foremost national figure and sole charismatic personality, President Sukarno."⁸⁹

The unwillingness of the military to move decisively against the president perhaps provided Sukarno with the impression that he could still control the military. This

⁸⁸ Ibid., 163.

⁸⁹ Sloan, *A Study in Political Violence*, 78

emboldened Sukarno to initiate a series of moves designed to reassert his authority reducing the powers of *Koti*, calling for formation of *Barisan Sukarno* or Sukarno's supporter,⁹⁰ and demanding the release of thousands of the *PKI* supporters. The president's offensive against the military culminated in the announcement of a cabinet reshuffle on 21 February 1966.⁹¹ Sukarno dismissed *Menhankam* or the Minister of Defense General Nasution and nine other cabinet members. In their places, Sukarno appointed his supporters as well as the *PKI* sympathizers.

Sukarno's intransigent attitude towards the military, his refusal to accept its expanding roles in politics, and his attempts to marginalize the military completely alienated the organization. The cabinet reshuffle, a clear attempt to deprive the military an independent voice in Indonesia politics, proved to be the principal factor in forcing the military to act against Sukarno. The military decided to adopt more drastic and explicit measures against the president, although it still did not envisage a military coup to seize power from the civilian leadership. One of these measures was the demand for the removal of certain ministers from the cabinet. Not surprising, Sukarno promptly disregarded this demand. Another measure was to create social unrest that would force the president to turn towards the military for assistance, thereby providing a leverage for the military. As such, the military encouraged students to create an atmosphere of anarchy in the capital and student demonstrations broke out on 23 February 1966. The

⁹⁰ In January 1966, faced with army-backed student demonstrations, Sukarno called for his supporters to form *barisans* (ranks) to defend him. This idea was subsequently picked up by the first deputy prime minister, Subandrio, who appealed in a radio speech for the formation of a *Barisan Sukarno*. See Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 167.

⁹¹ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 173-174.

demonstrations grew in scale, and the police were powerless to act as army forces protected the demonstrators. A decision was also taken to arrest a number of the ministers, although this was not carried out. The contestation culminated on 11 March 1966, when soldiers "took up positions in front of the palace" where a full cabinet meeting was in progress. Alarmed with the growing anarchical situation in the capital, and at the boldness of Suharto and the military, Sukarno had no choices but to hand most of the powers to Suharto. He signed a "letter" empowering Suharto, as the army commander, to take all steps deemed necessary to guarantee security, tranquillity and stability of the state.⁹² In June of that year, the military again showed its prerogative in calling for a session of the *MPRS* (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara* or Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) to obtain constitutional endorsement of Sukarno's "Letter of 11 March."⁹³ The military also interfered in determining the leadership of the other major political parties. It forced the *PNI* (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* or Indonesian National Party) to hold a congress in April 1966, and blatantly forced Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Sukarnoist general chairman and his supporters out of office, replacing them with an army-supported cadre.⁹⁴

Events immediately before, during and after the 1965 coup clearly demonstrated the maturity and the intensity of military contestations and prerogatives against the

⁹² This "letter" later became known as *Super Semar* (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret) or "Letter of 11 March." The circumstances under which Sukarno signed this "letter" remained unclear, though it is likely that he was under severe duress as a result of the situation in Jakarta and the belligerent attitude of the military towards him. For a comprehensive account of this event, see Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 179-196.

⁹³ Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 201.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

civilian leadership. With Suharto and Nasution at the helm, the army-the premier service in the Indonesian armed forces-eliminated the *PKI* as a political organization and eventually forced Sukarno out of office. The effects of these prerogatives and contestations were significant, affecting developments not only in the military but also in Indonesia's society. The previous multi polar political environment-with Sukarno, the *PKI* and the military playing active roles-essentially disappeared and the military emerged as the principal political player in Indonesian society.

E. THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES WITHIN THE NEW ORDER

The military continued to influence the development of civilian political machines during Suharto's *Orde Baru* ("New Order"). These efforts were however driven by Suharto, and not truly autonomous attempts to contest civilian authority. By the 1980s, the military appeared to have lost some of its usefulness to Suharto. The military was in a sense a victim of its own success, as it had effectively denuded the Indonesian political scene of all effective opposition to Suharto's rule. In addition, in the wake of the oil crisis in early 1980s, Suharto began to rely more on civilian expertise in his government to provide professional advice to his government. His ties with the military institution thus became more tenuous, and some degree of military contestations against him surfaced. Here, the definition of military contestations and prerogatives becomes nebulous. Suharto was a military general, and technically, any military initiatives against him cannot be considered as military contestations against the civilian leadership. However, this thesis sees President Suharto as more "civilianized" as he did not champion the military's cause constantly, but in fact took initiatives to contain the military so as to

safeguard his powers. As such, military initiatives against President Suharto are considered as military contestations and prerogatives against the civilian leadership.

Nevertheless, these contestation attempts were not of the scale and the scope of those against the civilian leaders of *Orde Lama* (Old Order). It was not simply because the military was reluctant to oppose one of its former generals. Rather, it was the skills of Suharto that had prevent such contestations. Suharto's success in manipulating the military in the struggle against Sukarno had provided him an intricate knowledge of the power-play within the military. He knew that a united military would be an unstoppable force in Indonesia, able to dictate directions to all parties within the state. Such a united military had served him well in challenging Sukarno and the civilians for power. However, in the absence of a viable civilian threat, it could prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to his plans. He still needed the military's support, but he could not allow the latter to become overly powerful politically. Suharto's initiatives against the military and the new military contestations against Suharto will be examined in this section to demonstrate the declining military's political roles.

1. The Military's Roles in Consolidating Suharto's Power

Suharto's attention was on consolidating his power in the political arena during his early years as president. The military continued to play a crucial role in assisting Suharto towards this end. The security apparatus *Kopkamtib* was transformed to become the government's main instrument of political control. Its functions increased from handling the *PKI* problem to dealing with a wide range of civilian dissidents, including students and Muslim demonstrators. In addition, newspapers required *Kopkamtib*'s

permission to publish, and on many occasions *Kopkamtib* withdrew their permits. In 1971, Suharto entrusted *Kopkamtib* with the maintenance of "security and order" during the election campaign and made many arrests to achieve this purpose.⁹⁵

Another instrument that Suharto used extensively to maintain political control over his rivals was *Bakin* (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijens Negara* or State Intelligence Coordinating Body). The military controlled this organization which was responsible for keeping watch over internal developments in the political parties and the Chinese community as well as being alert for signs of a Communist revival.⁹⁶ This apparatus became very effective in limiting the growth of democracy in Indonesia, and was often looked upon as the *Gestapo* or *KGB* of Indonesia. Thus, while not playing the independent role as in the pre-1965 period, the military continued to have a significant influence on Indonesia's political atmosphere.

The military played a notable role in assisting Suharto subdue the threat posed by Megawati, daughter of former president Sukarno. First the military attempted to influence the *PDI* (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* or Indonesian Democratic Party) congress meeting in 1993 by pressuring the *PDI* delegates not to elect Megawati as chairperson. Here, the military's attempts were unsuccessful as the congress elected Megawati to that post. The resultant Megawati-led the *PDI* represented an unprecedented challenge to the government. Suharto probably feared that if Megawati and the *PDI* were left unchecked, they could pose a serious threat to his re-election plans

⁹⁵ Ibid., 223.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

in 1998. To prevent this, Suharto used both civilian and military means to remove Megawati as the *PDI* leader. Personnel from the Interior ministry and the military used intimidation, coercion and bribery to split the *PDI* and to ensure that an extraordinary party congress was held in June 1996 to determine the *PDI*'s leadership. To prevent negative reports on the governmental intervention during the *PDI* congress, the Military Information Chief Brigadier-General Amir Syarifudin called in the chief editors of major national newspapers and news magazines and instructed them to report the conflict in a manner sympathetic to Megawati's opponents and the government and not endanger Indonesia's political stability. Between June 20 and 22 the congress proceeded without disruption. Troops guarded the congress site in Medan. Suharto officials like *Mendagri* (*Menteri Dalam Negeri* or Interior Affairs Minister) Yogie S. M. and *Pangab* General Feisal Tanjung addressed the delegates. As expected, there was an unanimous vote to remove Megawati and replace her with former the *PDI* leader Soerjadi, considered to be a more pliable figure.⁹⁷ Thus, the military continued to be an essential tool in quelling Suharto's political challengers. As such, Suharto could not afford to completely alienate the military in his attempts at controlling the institution.

2. Accommodating the Military

Suharto was aware that being a military general at the helm of Indonesia did not mean that the military would support him in all his policies throughout the years. He therefore had to maintain a delicate balance between accommodating and controlling the

⁹⁷ Ed Aspinall, "What happened before the riots?" *Inside Indonesia* (Edition No. 48: October-December 1996) available at <http://serve.com/inside/edit48/ed.htm>, accessed on 9 August 1998 by H. Haryono.

military. Suharto continued to sanction the military's *Dwi Fungsi* concept. The military continued to have representation in the cabinet, the government and in all levels of the society. In addition, Suharto did not clamp down on the military for pursuing economic interests or seeking unofficial financial aid from businessmen. On the other hand, he endeavored to control the military through various means to prevent its development again into an institution that could seriously threaten or curb his rule.

3. Controlling the Military

a. Military Appointments

By effectively exercising his powers as Supreme Commander of the military, Suharto was able to significantly influence the appointment of officers to senior positions both within and outside the military. Rather than a hierarchical chain of command typical of military administration, Suharto fostered a more arbitrary system based on personal loyalty, which allowed relatively junior or "obscure" officers to assume senior position.⁹⁸ Suharto rewarded officers who demonstrated loyalty, while shunting off others who were critical of him or threatening his hold on power. For example, Suharto did not bring back Nasution into the government during the formation of his first cabinet in 1966. Nasution could be a significant threat to Suharto's rule as he had widespread support within the military.

Suharto also became adept in marginalizing dissident officers, not sparing even his closest subordinates. One example was General Benny Murdani, who until 1988

⁹⁸ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change* (London: Routledge, 1993), 77.

was one of Suharto's most trusted and powerful aides. Up to and including his stint as *Pangab* from 1983 to 1988, Murdani remained fiercely loyal to Suharto and was openly dismissive of retired generals who criticize the president from the sidelines. However, he lost Suharto's trust when he broached with Suharto the subject of his (Suharto's) family's business activities and objected to Sudharmono's vice-presidency in 1988. Suharto did not accept his criticisms, although in retrospect those criticisms were valid and contributed to his downfall in 1998. As a result, Suharto removed Murdani from the powerful *Pangab* post to be *Menhankam*, a largely administrative post, in March 1988. Five years later, Suharto dropped Murdani from his cabinet altogether. Suharto also ordered the dismantling of the powerful intelligence agency *BAIS* (*Badan Intelijen Strategik* or Strategic Intelligence Agency) in 1994. This agency was Murdani's principal power base, and remained his strongest link to the military after 1988.⁹⁹ By sidelining even one of his closest aides, Suharto demonstrated that he would not tolerate any dissent within the military. He also proved that he had the prerogative to effect personnel changes at highest levels. The inability of the military as an institution to contest Suharto's actions illustrated the waning of political powers that it held during this period.

The trend of appointing "loyal" officers to premier positions became clearer. For example, many of his former *aides-de-camp* (ADCs) had risen to prominent positions within the military. These included *Pangab* General Wiranto, *Kasad* (Chief-of-

⁹⁹ Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 284-285.

Staff, Indonesian Army) General Subagyo Hadisiswoyo, *Kasospol* (Chief-of-Staff, Socio-political Affairs) Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and former *Kasal* (Chief-of-Staff, Indonesian Navy) Vice-Admiral Arief Kusharyadi.

Suharto had also appointed some of his close relatives to prime positions within the military. General Wismoyo Arismunandar, his brother-in-law, once held the post of *Kasad*. He elevated his son-in-law, Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto, rapidly through the ranks of the army, granting him important positions such as the commander of *Kopassus* (Special Forces Command) and commander of *Kostrad* (Army's Strategic Reserve Command).

Another method that Suharto utilized to keep the military in check was to appoint less charismatic officers to lead the forces. These included former *Pangab* and present *Menko Polkam* (Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs) General Feisal Tanjung and former *Kasad* General Hartono. These officers did not have strong grassroots support within the military, thereby ensuring that they would not be able to mount strong challenges against Suharto's rule.

Throughout the 1990s, Suharto interfered extensively in determining the top military leadership. Apart from General Edi Sudradjat, who once held the three top military post- *Menhankam*, *Pangab* and *Kasad*-briefly in 1993, the other generals who had held these posts were considered to be Suharto's loyalists. Suharto largely determined their appointments, and this aptly demonstrated the low military prerogative in deciding military appointments.

b. Political Appointments

Suharto had also ensured that the military remained a minority in his cabinets. In fact, the number of cabinet positions occupied by the military has decreased gradually through the years. In 1983, it held 13 out of the 32 cabinet positions. In 1988, this figure had dropped to 11 out of 38 positions and it further slid in 1993, with the military occupying 10 out of the 41 cabinet positions.

Suharto also reduced the number of officers in the legislative *DPR* (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or People's Representative Council). Prior to 1993, the military was allocated 100 out of the 500 *DPR* seats. However, in 1993, this was reduced to 75 seats.¹⁰⁰ The military was unable to resist this move, primarily because of the deferential nature of its leadership towards Suharto. The military still appreciated that Suharto was their most senior officer; therefore, the military should not argue with his decisions. Here, the military demonstrated a low level of military contestation against the political master, Suharto.

c. Exploiting the Military's Disunity

Over the last five decades, different factions have existed in the Indonesian military. Suharto exploited this factionalism in his attempts at controlling the military. By allowing such factions to exist, Suharto ensured that the military's attention was focused on its internal problems and not on his rule. In addition, he used the rivalries among the different factions to eliminate opponents of his policies. One prime example

¹⁰⁰ *Komposisi & Daftar Nama Anggota MPR: Komposisi Keanggotaan*, available at <http://mpr.wasantara.net.id/komposisi.htm>, accessed on 25 December 1999.

was the *Malari* (*Malapetaka Januari* or January Disaster) incident in 1974, when General Ali Murtopo, one of Suharto's most trusted officers, succeeded in ousting the faction led by General Sumitro, a critic of Suharto's policies. After this incident, officers understood that personal loyalty to Suharto counted a great deal more than institutional clout.¹⁰¹

Another method that Suharto utilized to reduce the military's ability to contest his policies was by constantly pitting the generals against each other. This was facilitated by the creation of intelligence bodies that, besides their stated internal security role, investigated the military's sentiments. Suharto ensured the loyalty of these bodies by employing his trusted generals like Ali Murtopo, Yoga Sugama and Benny Murdani as heads of these bodies through the years. These bodies were able to weave an intelligence network so intricate that the officer corps was mistrustful of one another and incapable of uniting against him.¹⁰²

4. Suharto's Cultivation of the Islamic Faction

Murdani's criticisms of Suharto and his family in 1988 probably showed Suharto

¹⁰¹ By 1974, disillusionment among some of Suharto's military supporters was on the rise. Contrary to popular belief, fighting corruption was not a central priority of the government and in fact became institutionalized within the military. Suharto's top two advisors, Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani, were considered to be the leaders of these "financial general." These "financial generals" were considered to be bringing the army into disrepute and detracting from efforts to modernize the armed forces. As such, a group of "professional soldiers" looked towards General Sumitro (head of *Kopkamtib*) to oppose them. Sumitro employed his considerable powers to stir up student protests, prompting mass demonstrations and the burning of cars during a visit by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in January 1974. The result was a triumph for the "financial generals," as Sumitro was blamed for inciting the students. He and his supporters were relieved from their posts. See Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting*, 33-35; Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto*, 75.

¹⁰² Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto*, 76.

that he could not totally rely on close military subordinates to follow his policies blindly. Thus, in addition to employing "divide and rule" tactics in the military as a means of control, Suharto began to turn to other organizations as a balancing force to the military's influence—a tactic used by Sukarno in the early 1960s as he allowed the *PKI* to support him. Suharto exploited the military's suspicions of Islamic fundamentalists when he turned towards the Muslims to play this role in the early 1990s. He was certain that the military would not join forces with any large Islamic organizations but would in fact contain it. Suharto allowed and even strongly sponsored the formation of *ICMI* (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* or Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) in 1990, headed by then *Menristek* (Minister for Research and Technology) B.J. Habibie. This organization included among its membership critical non-governmental Muslim leaders and long-serving cabinet members. *ICMI* was set up as a sounding board for Muslim input into public policy, supported by its own think-tank, the Center for Information and Development Studies, and even had its own newspaper, *Republika*, to help formulate and broadcast Muslim views.

The military's leadership did not successfully oppose the formation of *ICMI*, despite its traditional suspicion of Islamic organizations. Again, this demonstrated the inability of the military to counter civilian initiatives, another indication of the low level of military contestation it could exercise in Suharto's era.

5. Military Acquisitions

The military did not always have total autonomy in determining its acquisition plans during *Orde Baru*. The civilians sometimes determined military hardware

purchases, and these decisions did not necessarily conform with military requirements. One example was the acquisition of aircraft in 1993. The Indonesian air Force wanted fighter aircraft like the F-16s to augment its air defense, and ground-attack aircraft like the Hawk 100/200. However, the government's subsequent decision was to acquire 24 Hawk 100/200 aircraft and no F-16's, because Habibie wanted to join with British Aerospace. This decision was attributed to the influence exerted by former *Menristek* B.J. Habibie. As *Menristek*, Habibie had his own agenda in that he wanted to raise the technological levels of *IPTN* (*Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara* or National Aircraft Industry). In this case, British Aerospace was willing to transfer technological knowledge as part of the deal. In addition, Habibie secured the license to manufacture Hawk 100/200 parts for sale back to British Aerospace. These represented lucrative commercial and technological advantages for Habibie and *IPTN*. Using his strong personal relationship with Suharto, Habibie was able to bypass the Air Force's requirements and persuaded Suharto to acquire the Hawk 100/200 aircraft.

Another example where civilians were able to determine military acquisitions was the purchase of 39 ex-East German warships in 1992.¹⁰³ Apparently, only Suharto and Habibie were involved in the decision to acquire these ships.¹⁰⁴ Habibie clearly did not consult the Indonesian Navy in the acquisition process; it did not even have the required infrastructure to accommodate these ships or manpower to crew the ships. Nor did the navy want these ships as they had bad experiences with Soviet designed and

¹⁰³ These are 16 *Parchim* class corvettes, nine *Kondor* class minesweepers and 14 *Frosch* class landing ships.

¹⁰⁴ Lowry, *Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 98.

manufactured hardware in the 1960s. However, Habibie was able to convince Suharto that this was a good buy-the total cost of the 39 ships was about US\$ 120 million. Again, Habibie had his own agenda for promoting this purchase. PT PAL shipyard, an important component of his strategic defense industries, stood to benefit from this acquisition. This shipyard would be involved in the refitting, customizing and acclimatizing of these ships for use in the tropics.

The purchases of the Hawk 100/200 attack aircraft and the 39 ex-East German ships are the only significant capital equipment purchases by the military in the 1990s. There were no U.S. military equipment purchased at that time due to the U.S.A. beliefs that the Indonesian Armed Forces violated the human rights in Aceh, Irian Jaya (now Papua), and East Timor. Habibie, who had a close relationship with Suharto, heavily influenced both of these acquisitions. While this had not occurred frequently, it nevertheless shows the vulnerability of the military to civilian initiatives during Suharto's era. One can consider the level of military prerogative in determining military acquisition to be low in recent times.

6. Successful Military Prerogative Against Suharto

One of the successful military prerogatives against Suharto was in the choice of the Vice-President in the 1993 election. The military pre-empted Suharto in nominating *Pangab* General Try Sutrisno as their choice of vice-president in 1993 even though Suharto had yet to make his wishes known. The other *MPR* (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or People's Consultative Assembly) factions quickly backed the military choice. As such, the military forced Suharto to accept Sutrisno, as he did not want to be seen

rejecting the stated views of the *MPR* that it is constitutionally responsible for selecting the nation's top leaders. Then, Suharto had taken steps to prevent such an occurrence in order to keep his position as president. Otherwise, the People's Consultative Assembly would have a special meeting to dismiss him. Later he dropped two leading military politicians, *Menhankam* General Murdani and *Mendagri* (Interior Affairs Minister) General Rudini, from his 1993 cabinet. In addition, several officers close to Murdani like then-*Kassospol* Harsudiono Hartas and Air Marshal Teddy Rusdy, a top aide to General Sutrisno, were unexpectedly overlooked for cabinet jobs in 1993. This probably was Suharto's response to the military officers presumptuous enough to restrict his latitude in choosing a vice-president.¹⁰⁵ Thus, while the military successfully exercised their prerogatives against Suharto, in some areas Suharto was able to retaliate against the military's initiative in other ways.

F. THE FALL OF SUHARTO

1. Military Involvement in Suharto's Resignation

The extent of military involvement in shaping the recent events in Indonesia that led to the 21 May 1998 downfall of Suharto remains unclear. Some reports painted an impression that the military was unable to influence events. For example, in mid-May, *Pangab* General Wiranto refused to back a call by Parliament Speaker Harmoko for

¹⁰⁵ Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting*, 286.

Suharto to resign, saying that it had no basis in law¹⁰⁶. However, this did not appear to have much effect as Suharto was forced to relinquish his leadership to Vice-President Habibie; an indication of the low military influence in politics. Other reports indicated that it was an ultimatum from the military that forced Suharto to resign as President.¹⁰⁷ If so, the military would have demonstrated a high level of contestation against Suharto. In any case, the military still wielded an influence over the national leadership issue, and various reports have indicated that the military's consent was a crucial factor in allowing key leadership changes-Habibie assuming the presidency and Akbar Tandjung assuming chairmanship of *Golkar*.

2. *Kopassus* Involvement in the May 1998 Riots

Reports have indicated that some *Kopassus* members under the order of Lieutenant-General Prabowo and Muchdi were involved in the kidnappings of political activists and the shooting of protesters during the May 1998 turmoil in Indonesia. This represented a clear attempt to influence the political situation then, although the aims of these initiatives are debatable. It is possible that Prabowo was creating a situation in which he, as the *Kostrad* commander, would be able to engineer a coup attempt against *Pangab* Wiranto, or even against Suharto. Alternatively, he could be under the instructions from Suharto to intimidate his political opposition. The military leadership and the institution probably did not orchestrate these kidnappings and shootings, rather,

¹⁰⁶ "Suharto resign call 'illegal'," *Straits Times Interactive*, available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea1_0819.htm, accessed on 19 May 1998 by H. Haryono.

¹⁰⁷ "Did military tell Suharto to step down?" *The Straits Times Interactive*, available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea4_1023.htm, accessed on 23 May 1998 by H. Haryono.

these unfortunate actions were masterminded by one individual officer-Prabowo. This appeared to be the position advocated by *Pangab* General Wiranto to absolve the military institution (and himself) of these acts. As such, this event may not be indicative of the level of military's prerogative against civilians.

3. Initiative to Reduce the Military's Political Influence

There had been several indications that the military would limit its political interventions in the post-Suharto era. *Kassospol* Lieutenant-General Bambang Yudhoyono stated in June 1998 that "the idea of *ABRI* (Indonesian Armed Forces) now is to readjust its role, to build a new political role-sharing. One such response, he said, would require the armed forces to begin pulling back from their traditional "dual function" involvement in politics, influencing society indirectly instead of directly¹⁰⁸. President Habibie in his Independence Day speech on 15 August 1998 echoed the same sentiments. He called for a new bottom-up approach in readjusting the military's socio-political roles, and to move away from the security approach-using security forces-to ensure stability in Indonesia.¹⁰⁹

This was further affirmed by *Pangab/Menhankam* General Wiranto, when he announced on 21 August 1998 that the military would adopt new principles in redefining *Dwi Fungsi*. These principles included "political" role-sharing with non-military

¹⁰⁸ Lieutenant-General Bambang Yudhoyono, quoted in "Abri will ease out of political role" *The Straits Times Interactive*, available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea1_1115.htm, accessed on 22 June 1998 by H. Haryono.

¹⁰⁹ "Indonesia in an era of democratic resurgence", *The Straits Times Interactive*, available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea1_1016.htm, accessed on 16 August 1998 by H. Haryono.

partners" and ending its policy of "occupying" troubled territories. However, he also mentioned that the military did not intend to relinquish its socio-political role, although it would no longer attempt to dominate political life in the new reform era. The military still saw itself as the national savior, and would in the short term continue to ensure that Indonesia "recover from the economic crisis, engage in and control the reformation process, to guarantee the continuity of development."¹¹⁰

Habibie could dictate any changes to the military's socio-political role as he did not have a strong political base and in fact had to rely on the military to support his initiatives. Therefore, more likely that the military exercised its prerogative in initiating this review of its *Dwi Fungsi* roles. The reasons for such a move are still unclear; perhaps the military foresaw that a reduced military presence in the political arena is a pre-requisite for the democratization of Indonesia, and as such, is taking the necessary steps to gracefully reduce its involvement in Indonesian politics. Or perhaps the military is trying to recover its prestige as the leader of Indonesian society after its excesses during Suharto's *Orde Baru*—its heavy-handed suppression of separatist problems in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya—and especially its poor handling of the riots in May and June of 1998.

G. SUMMARY

The military has continuously exercised its *Dwi Fungsi* roles in Indonesian society since the struggle for independence. However, the above analysis has determined

¹¹⁰ "Wiranto outlines new roles for the armed forces," *The Straits Times Interactive*, available at <http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea11220.htm>, accessed on 22 August 1998 by H. Haryono.

that the levels of its political influence have fluctuated through the years. The 1940s and 1950s represented the formative years of the military's political posture. This period saw the military exercising its prerogatives and contestations against civilian decisions affecting mainly military matters, for example, its leadership and structure. Even so, it had experienced failures in its contestation attempts.

The *Orde Lama* period (1959-1965) saw the expansion of the military's influence in the political arena. Significantly, the military began to interfere extensively in areas beyond military affairs. It successfully countered Sukarno's moves to sideline its influence, eliminated the *PKI* and eventually forced Sukarno out of office. Military initiatives also successfully shaped foreign affairs during *Konfrontasi*. Its success shaped the behavior of all political players, as civilian leaders subsequently had to factor in the military's potential reactions to political decisions. The frequency and scope of military prerogatives and contestations during *Orde Lama* thus illustrated a leap from those previously undertaken.

Orde Baru (1966-1998) saw the general decline of the military's influence in politics, although it continued to play an important role exercising its social roles at the lower levels of Indonesian society. Suharto's intimate knowledge of the military enabled him to exercise a relatively successful "checks-and-balances" strategy in containing the military's political role. His continued employment of loyalists in key positions ensured that he maintained effective control over the military. By the 1990s, he had rendered the military leadership basically impotent, unable to counter Suharto's and Habibie's initiatives. Even the recent events leading to and following the downfall of Suharto

proved that the military was unable to exercise its prerogatives or contestations at pre-*Orde Baru* levels.

In summary, the levels of military prerogatives and contestations against civilians are depicted in Table 2.

Table 2. Summary of the Levels of Military Prerogatives and Contestations

Period	Level of Military Prerogatives and Contestations	Remarks
Pre-Old Order (1944-1959)	Moderate-High	Prerogatives and contestations conducted mainly to assert control over military affairs
Old Order (1959-1966)	High	The frequency of military prerogatives and contestations increased. The military did not confine its interference to military affairs. It also actively sought to influence outcomes in both Indonesia's domestic politics as well as foreign affairs.
New Order (1966-1998)	High-Moderate	The military still played a pivotal part in Indonesia's politics. However, Suharto was successful in limiting the military's influence by the 1990s. The frequency and scope of military interference also decreased.
Post -New Order	Moderate-Low	The extent of military interference in the downfall of Suharto is still unknown. In reality, Suharto resigned because the mass of students demanded he to resign and the <i>TNI</i> could not protect Suharto because the <i>TNI</i> is a part of Indonesian society ("people army").

The next chapter will put forward some reasons for the decline of the military's socio-political role in Indonesian society. The motives of Suharto—the main player in

instigating this decline—will be examined. In addition, the possibility that the military would voluntarily relinquish some of its political initiatives exists. As Indonesia matures, it is natural that the military would want to retreat to the background of the socio-political arena and allow civilians take the lead in these areas, unless the civilians seriously threaten its basic ideals. This aspect will be examined.

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IV. REASONS FOR THE DECLINING OF THE ARMED FORCES' SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE

Now I am a civilian. But my retirement from active military service does not mean that I have ceased to serve as a member of the Army. Moreover, the law states that a retired soldier carries on as a member of the reserve corps of the Armed Forces.

Suharto, *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds*¹¹¹

The Third Chapter demonstrated the fluctuations in the military's socio-political participation throughout the years. The military's political involvement matured during the *Orde Lama* period, with extensive interventions in both domestic and international politics. However, this trend did not continue into Suharto's *Orde Baru* period. From its successes in the constant struggle against the civilian leadership during the *Orde Lama* period, the military's ability to successfully contest Suharto's initiatives saw a gradual decline.

This chapter will put forward some of the possible reasons for the decline in the levels exercised by the military in the socio-political arena. There is no single answer that can explain the decline; rather, it is a very complex process that cannot be simplified. Several avenues will be explored, examining pressures within and outside the military that could compel the decline in these roles.

¹¹¹ Quoted in Salim Said, *Suharto's Armed Forces: Building a Power Base in New Order Indonesia, 1996-1998* (ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 6, June 1998), 535.

A. SUHARTO'S INITIATIVES TO MARGINALIZE THE MILITARY

Most western scholars largely ignored Suharto's manipulation of the military as they saw him and the military as a seamless team and his government as a military regime. Suharto was too strong in his position at that time. What the scholars could do was just giving the criticisms. However, this section contends that Suharto had played a pivotal role in marginalizing military in the political arena. Prior to his resignation in May 1998, Suharto had been largely successful in molding the military to meet his requirements. He treated the military in the same manner as other parts of the political apparatus—using the institution effectively in accordance to his desires, and at the same time ensuring that military remained firmly under in his control. Being a former army general, Suharto knew the intricacies of the military's organization and internal affairs. He was able to develop the skills he had gleaned from handling the 1965 coup and its aftermath. Specifically, he was able to utilize his power and resources as the military's *Pangti* (*Panglima Tertinggi* or Supreme Commander) to directly influence military appointments, promotions and developmental directions. It was not surprising that Suharto directed his attention at containing the military, given the fact that it was the most organized and competent player in Indonesia's political scene. The following section will present some possible explanations for Suharto's attempts at limiting the military's political influence. The following are only possible reasons, as the analysis entails the studying of one man's mind—Suharto's—and assumes that he was a rational player in deciding his courses of action. Some possible explanations for Suharto's attempts at limiting military socio-political roles decreasing divide into:

1. The Military as a Political Rival

The successful elimination of the *PKI* after the 1965 coup left the military as the only organized body capable of mounting political challenges against the civilian leadership. Suharto no doubt was aware of this fact as he was one of the major proponents of an active political role for the military to confront Sukarno. In addition, it was his skillful manipulation of the military's socio-political role that had initially provided him with the legitimacy to wrest the ruling powers from Sukarno. However, he was aware that a strong and united military could potentially become a significant rival to his rule if he was unsuccessful in controlling the institution. Thus, he could not simply strip these roles from the military, as such an action would alienate the latter and possibly turn the military against him. As such, Suharto had to continually seek to contain the political ambitions of the military while at the same time allowing it to exercise its socio-political role in order to eliminate the institution as a potential political rival. Suharto was afraid that if the military was strong and united, then the military would move against him and his family. The military has the capability to take over state power, provided it is able to form a consensus within its top ranks to do so. Suharto ensured that the military's attention was focused on its internal problems and not on his rule. Another method that Suharto utilized to reduce the military's ability to contest his policies was by constantly pitting the generals against each other.

2. Fear over Possible Military Coups

Another plausible reason that could explain Suharto's decision to reduce the military's political influence was his fear of military coups. While the military leadership

had always emphasized that it would never conduct a coup against a legitimate civilian government, the possibility was always present given the strength of the military and its extensive involvement in politics. As Suharto became increasingly authoritative in his rule and his attempts at marginalizing the military became more apparent in the 1990s, the risk of a military coup against him undoubtedly increased. Suharto therefore had to continue his efforts in containing the military, even courting the Muslim faction in the 1990s as a "balance" against the influence of the military.

3. Cronyism and Nepotism

Another possible reason for marginalizing the military could be that Suharto was aiming to protect his family's' and friends' business interest. By the 1980s, the business tentacles of the First Family had spread throughout the Indonesian economy, dabbling into the financial, investment, production and distribution sectors. Before the downfall of Suharto, the conglomerates formed by his children were among the largest in the country.¹¹² These conglomerates benefited from the licenses and concessions granted to them and their companies by their father's government.¹¹³ The economist who have studied the family's business operations say there has rarely been even the pretense of

¹¹² *Bimantara Citra*, owned by Suharto's son Trihatmodjo, was one of Indonesia's largest companies, with subsidiaries in hotels, telecommunications, chemicals and food. The president's eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (widely known as Tutut), also built up a business empire with her sisters in 1983, and later with her husband. The *Humpuss* Group belonging to sons Hutomo and Sigit Harjojudanto also benefited from Suharto's patronage.

¹¹³ *Humpuss* and *Bimantara* were granted concessions for the overseas distribution of petrochemical products manufactured by the government oil company, while Mrs. Rukmana was awarded the right to build toll roads through Jakarta. In the 1990s, television licenses were granted to both Trihatmodjo and Mrs. Rukmana. In addition, a group of investors led by Trihatmodjo took control of the state-owned Palapa commercial satellite network.

competitive bidding when business owned by the president or his children have been awarded government contracts.¹¹⁴

In addition to the obvious nepotism, Suharto also had to ensure that the military did not interfere in the crony capitalism he was pursuing. Benefiting from close connections to the president, these "crony businessmen" like Liem Sioe Liong and Mohammed "Bob" Hasan were able to build vast conglomerates, amassing wealth through government-granted import and trading monopolies, privileged access to government contracts and state bank credit, and the ability to bend government policies in their favor. In return, they would bankroll a good measure of Suharto's patronage activities and stand ready to provide emergency funds in crisis situations.¹¹⁵

The Indonesian military had traditionally relied on its participation in the economy to supplement the meager defense budgets. The Gross Domestic Product (total value of goods and services produced annually) in 1997 was \$960.0 billion. Through appointments in the various civilian corporations, the military was able to siphon off a substantial amount of funds for its use. In addition, the military's stretch into the economy is extensive, both through official foundations and enterprises as well as on the

¹¹⁴ Philip Shenon, "For the First Family of Indonesia, an Empire Now in Jeopardy," *The New York Times*, January 16, 1998.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

individual basis.¹¹⁶ The first family's and friends' business practices thus threatened the military's sources of revenue. The Indonesian economy, though large, was still a finite pie and the military in the 1980s began to find its share of the pie gradually diminishing as the First Family expanded into its domain. This hurt both the institution's financial position as well as the individual officer's income. Such developments would promote a sense of dissatisfaction among the military officers. Some would consider the First Family and their friends as benefiting at the military's expense-it was primarily the military that created the stable conditions for economic growth and these conglomerates were denying the military opportunities to benefit from its hard-earned successes. Officers used to enjoying a certain standard of living through extra-military economic activities would be enraged as opportunities for increasing their personal wealth became threatened. Thus, as Suharto allowed his family and friends to expand their commercial enterprises, he also had to forestall any resistance from the military. The fact that he succeeded in protecting the economic interests and that nepotism and cronyism prevailed extensively during *Orde Baru* signified his mastery in stifling the military's ability to contest his policies.

¹¹⁶ By appointing officers to non-military corporations such as *Pertamina* (the state oil corporation) and *Bulog* (National Logistics Board), the military was able to siphon off a substantial amount of funds for the military's usage. In addition, the military also set up various foundations and enterprises like *Yayasan Dharma Putra* Kostrad and *PT Tri Usaha Bhakti* which expanded its economic reach to the various sectors in the economy-an automobile assembling plant, a battery factory, clothing and shoe factories, rice mills, banks, hotels, food exporters, forestry projects in Kalimantan and Ambon and even airlines (Mandala, Seulawah and Zamrud Airlines). Individually, officers also entered the economy to improve their financial status, through both legitimate as well as illegitimate avenues. Often, these officers exploited their influential positions within the society to facilitate their economic ventures, or to obtain "commissions" from applicants of contracts and licenses. Here, the military leadership apparently adopted the view that it was perfectly natural for officers to exploit their official positions for personal gain. For a more detailed account, see Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 273-303.

4. Reduced Usefulness of the Military

In a sense, the military was victim of its own success. Since 1965, it had effectively wiped out political opposition to the Suharto regime. As such, by the late 1980s, the president did not need the military as much as in the early years of his rule. He thus could afford to alienate the military to a certain extent without adversely affecting his political position.

5. Legitimacy in the International Arena

During the Cold War, western countries like the United States muted their criticisms of military or authoritarian regimes if such regimes took an anti-Communist stance. However, the end of the Cold War saw an increase in both the volume and tenacity of these criticisms by both governmental and non-governmental personalities. Being the leader of the world's fourth most populous nation and the largest country in Southeast Asia, Suharto would want an international stature befitting Indonesia's size and potential influence. He would not want to be viewed merely as the military leader of a third world nation. Thus, this desire to achieve an acceptable world status in the post-Cold War era could be a reason for Suharto to deliberately distance himself from the military so as to enhance his own legitimacy internationally. A maneuver in marginalizing the military politically would demonstrate to the world that his government had progressed beyond its formative phase and had transformed into a non-military regime.

B. INTRA-MILITARY PRESSURES

By the late 1980s, the military as an institution did not actively resist Suharto's initiatives in marginalizing its socio-political positions in society. The weak and subservient military leadership comprising mainly Suharto's loyal appointees, largely followed Suharto's directions without question. During *Orde Baru*, the military as an institution did not actively promote a reduction in its socio-political involvement. It was still reaping the benefits of the system and therefore had no impetus to adjust its perception of its socio-political role. It was only after the resignation of Suharto that military initiatives to examine and reform its socio-political participation surfaced. Certainly, the tumultuous events of 1998-the push for democracy, the society's rejection of the Indonesian military's traditional societal roles, the military's "dirty war" against political activists¹¹⁷-promoted the military to rethink the relevancy of its socio-political roles.

Under the new leadership of a new generation of officers like *Pangab* General Wiranto and *Kassospol* Lieutenant-General Bambang Yudhoyono, the military has openly signaled its intention to reduce its socio-political influence. *Kassospol* Yudhoyono stated that the military would "remain above" *GOLKAR* and other political parties and refrain from intervening in their activities as it had done in previous years.

¹¹⁷ There had been unconfirmed reports and revelations of human rights abuses-such as kidnapping of student activists and atrocities in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya. In addition, members of the military were involved in kidnapping and killings of activists during the 1998 political upheaval, although these military personnel were apparently pursuing their own agenda and do not appear to have been following directions from the military headquarters.

Pangab Wiranto had also announced plans to separate the police from the military.¹¹⁸

Other initiatives planned include the reduction of military officers in other governmental ministries. The following section will offer some reasons for these recent military moves to reduce its socio-political role.

1. Maintaining Legitimacy After the New Order Period

Evidently, the Indonesian population deeply resents the military's heavy-handed methods in quelling social disorders during the New Order period. Thus, it is logical that in the post-Suharto era, the military would seek to deflect criticisms of its past actions and put the blame on the policies of the old regime. This would help salvage whatever legitimacy it once possessed. Already, the military had admitted it was used as a political tool by former President Suharto to further his political and other interests when he was in power. The military further acknowledged that it had exceeded its dual-function role during the New Order. Thus, an effective method to achieve the above aim is to declare a re-examination of its socio-political role and unilaterally offer to reduce its involvement in the political arena. This would help satisfy the population to some degree and yet allow the military to maintain its socio-political role in society.

The decision to separate the police from the military structure could also be predicated on the military's attempts to maintain legitimacy in society. The police force was incorporated into the military in 1963,¹¹⁹ thereby allowing the military to have a

¹¹⁸ *The Jakarta Post*, April 5, 1999.

¹¹⁹ Singh, *Dwi Fungsi ABRI*, 33.

legitimate role in ensuring the domestic security in addition to its external defense role. However, its oppressive methods in curbing social unrest through the years were less-than-welcome by the population, and its stature and legitimacy built up during the independence struggle gradually diminished. By once again reinstating the police as an independent force, any subsequent police actions could not be attributed to military policies. In this way, the military could hope to regain its legitimacy and stature in society.

2. A Reduced Role in Democracy

The military probably realized that its strong presence throughout all sectors of society had stifled the growth of effective non-governmental agencies and political parties. These organizations are necessary to foster healthy social and political environments in a truly democratic Indonesia. A responsible military in the post-Suharto era would therefore want to prevent repeating the same mistakes made during *Orde Baru* and not suppress the development of these organizations. Thus, the military leadership could have initiated the recent reforms to help divorce the military from direct intervention in domestic political affairs, thereby allowing the proper growth of political parties and non-governmental organizations.

3. Professionalism and Discipline

The Indonesian military that emerged in the post-Suharto period was lacking both in skills and equipment to effectively confront an external military threat. It had to rely on decades-old war fighting doctrines developed during its independence struggle against

the Dutch. Thus, a retreat from non-military affairs would allow the military to concentrate on professional development to update and upgrade the military into a modern war-fighting machine.

The Asian economic crisis of 1997 severely affected Indonesia in all aspects. As a result, the military suffered a reduction in the military budget from \$997.0 billion in 1994 to 960.0 billion in 1997. The defense spending was 1.3 % of GDP in 1997.¹²⁰ This lack of funds, coupled with the scaling back of bilateral training exercises as regional countries like Malaysia also began to feel the pinch of the crisis, meant that opportunities for professional training were also drastically reduced. Thus, the military would have to concentrate on professional training rather than expanding its socio-political role to maintain its level of professionalism. A desire to maintain its professionalism in this economic hardship period could therefore contribute to the military leadership's decision to reduce its socio-political involvement.

Clearly, the present military leadership-western-trained and considered to be highly professional-would not condone the rampant corruption within the military during *Orde Baru*. Only a reduction in the military's socio-political participation, thereby reducing its influence in society and economy, could help re-establish some degree of discipline and decrease the levels of corruption. Thus, the end of *Orde Baru* presented an opportunity for the military leadership to advocate a reduction in the level of socio-

¹²⁰ "Economy" *Country Profile: Indonesia*, available at <http://abcnews.go.com/reference/countries/ID.html> accessed at 1210 by H.Haryono.

political participation and to re-install a sense of discipline and professionalism in the military.

C. OTHER DOMESTIC PRESSURES

1. Pressures from Civil Organizations

In spite of the relentless crackdown on opposition political parties and social organizations during *Orde Baru*, certain organizations like *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (LBH or Legal Aid Foundation) and Human Rights Commission were allowed to operate in Indonesia. These organizations were instrumental in highlighting the human rights abuses in the country, particularly those conducted by the military in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya. The exposure of these excesses towards the end of *Orde Baru* (in 1998) certainly added pressure on the military to consider reforming its approach towards internal security in the post-Suharto era. Already, the military is likely to abandon its "security approach" towards resolving domestic disturbances. Undoubtedly, military reforms initiated in the near future would seek to reduce further criticisms of its policies and actions by such organizations.

2. Push from the Population

Apart from organized non-governmental institutions, the military also faced mounting pressure from the population to initiate reforms. As a "people's army," the Indonesian military has to consider the general wishes of the people in order to retain its legitimacy in society. The opportunity for the military to appease the population arose with the resignation of Suharto. Again, this would relieve some pressure off the military

and at the same time allow the military to regain the population's trust and its stature in society.

D. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES

The resignation of Suharto took place in the midst of an economic crisis. While the extent of the military's involvement in Suharto's downfall is still unclear, its behavior in the post-Suharto era appeared to demonstrate a certain degree of responsibility in handling the deteriorating political and economic situations. The military leadership probably realized that international opinions are against military regimes like *Orde Baru* Indonesia. In addition, it would also assess that further Western financial and military aids provided to Indonesia would call for some degree of political reforms. These reforms would ultimately affect the military's socio-political role. As such, the military could have decided to pre-empt such western pressures by reducing its socio-political role before being forced to take these reforms. This would allow the military to keep "face" domestically and internationally, by proclaiming that it was acting on its own initiatives. It would also allow the institution to better maintain its credibility in the domestic political scene.

Here, the decision to separate the police from the military would be a positive step towards rehabilitating Indonesia's famished image. Firstly, the image of the Indonesian government as a military regime would be diminished, as the military is no longer responsible for internal security. In addition, such a move would also present an impression that the military was returning to its professional roots. These impressions are important in improving Indonesia's international image, as well as the professional image

of the military. In turn, it would facilitate Indonesia's attempts to solicit foreign financial and military aid during this economic crisis and beyond.

Many people expected the Indonesian military to step in decisively and seize power from Suharto during the tumultuous first half of 1998. The situation in Indonesia then was certainly chaotic with full-scale riots occurring in the major cities in the archipelago. However, the Indonesian military did not step in to seize power. Here, it acted responsibly and allowed the existing civilian apparatus to control the domestic political situation, including the change in the country's leadership. By not conducting a military coup but instead supporting democratic reforms, the military was able to maintain its credibility and its legitimacy in the Indonesian society in the post-Suharto era.

The above analysis has offered some possible reasons for the reduction of the military's socio-political influence during *Orde Baru* and in the immediate period after Suharto's resignation. Suharto's own mandate in ensuring his rule and the prosperity of his family probably dictate the military's directions during *Orde Baru*. This state of events remained until the economic downturn in 1997 and 1998, which unleashed a wave of discontent in Indonesia that Suharto could not suppress and ultimately leading to his resignation. A consequence of this crisis also released the military from Suharto's grasp, allowing it to exercise its own initiatives in the post-Suharto era. Until now, the military leadership apparently has decided to continue with the reduction of the institution's socio-political roles, although it had emphasized that it would not consider a total elimination of these roles. The possible reasons for this military's decision are listed above. The next

section will postulate the impact on Indonesian society of such a reduction in the military's socio-political role.

**E. IMPACT OF THE REDUCED LEVEL OF THE ARMED FORCES
SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE**

1. Impact on the Armed Forces

a. *Return to Professionalism*

Since the end of *Konfrontasi*, the Indonesian military's attention had been deflected away from the development of a modern fighting force designed to combat external threats. Thus, a reduced role in the socio-political arena would allow the military to focus its attention on the professional aspects of soldiering. The abilities to effectively contain and repulse external military threats would enhance the security of Indonesia and would also contribute to regional stability.

In addition, the impending separation of the police from the military will contribute towards the development of a more professional military. By relieving the military of the onerous task of ensuring internal domestic stability, the separation would also allow the police to develop its own forces independently in accordance with internationally accepted police practices. This would result in the development of a professional police force.

b. *Manpower Development*

The military would reduce the number of senior officers deployed to non-military organizations, ministries and in the political system both in the *MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or People's Consultative Council) and *DPR (Dewan*

Perwakilan Rakyat or People's Representative Council) under the new military initiatives to limit its participation in the socio-political arena. This would likely create problems for the military as the institution had often used these non-military posts as career positions for its officers. In the short term, one potential problem is that the military cannot find enough positions to re-deploy these officers. In the long term, the military will have to restructure its organization to account for the reduction in deployment positions. While the military officers now would be at a higher risk of being made redundant, the organization as a whole could benefit from this excess pool of officers. It can now afford to choose the best officers to fill the limited number of posts; officers who can contribute towards increasing the level of professionalism within the military.

c. Reduction in Finances

The withdrawal of military officers from their non-military posts would deny them the opportunities to obtain financial gains from these positions in the form of official allowances and unofficial bribes. This would create a group of dissatisfied senior officers whose incomes are being reduced. The morale in the officer corps would likely be negatively affected by the diminishing prospects of earning additional incomes. Thus, while there is apparently a desire to reduce the socio-political involvement, the loss of supplementary income would be a factor for resisting such moves. Again, this is a problem that the military leadership has to confront and resolve before taking concrete steps towards the reduction of these roles.

2. Impact on Indonesian Society

a. Potential Power Vacuum

The military has been deeply involved in the Indonesian society since the independence struggle. The sudden withdrawal from participating in these roles could impact negatively on society. This will be a vacuum in the Indonesian society where the military has traditionally existed, for example, in developing backward villages through the *ABRI Masuk Desa* programs. Unless the withdrawal is gradual and other agencies are allowed to be developed to replace the military in these areas, this would become a major problem for the Indonesian population. The ensuing vacuum would likely mean that social developments could be stunted with the lack of direction and supervision. As such, a responsible military would want to limit the extent of the immediate reduction in socio-political role in order to minimize the potential disturbances to society. In addition, it would have to assist in the development of civil institutions that could fulfill these social roles. The military could second personnel to such organizations to help develop the necessary infrastructure as well as to impart its experiences in order to accelerate the learning curve.

b. True Democracy or "Liberal Democracy?"

The euphoria after Suharto's resignation in mid 1998, and the expectations of true democracy in Indonesia has resulted in an explosion of political parties in Indonesia. While that democracy in the western sense (1950-1957) has prevailed, it also result in a relapse of the Indonesian political system to the "Liberal Democracy" environment experienced during Sukarno's era (1957-1966). Then, the multitude of

political parties resulted in coalition governments that were ineffective in governing the country, and it was the resultant instability that prompted the military together with Sukarno to actively intervene in the political system. This is a situation that a responsible Indonesian military would seek to prevent, as such a climate would prove to be socially and politically destabilizing. As such, this concern would likely temper the level of withdrawal the military is contemplating in the near future.

It was through the turbulent times of the independence struggle that the Indonesian military cemented its socio-political role in the society. It is again through social and political upheavals in 1998 that the Indonesian military was contemplating a change in directions with regards to these same roles. The discontents that led to the removal of President Suharto had initiated a desire for social changes and style of governance in Indonesia. Both existing and emerging political players together with the educated are demanding widespread political changes to replace the authoritarian regime of *Orde Baru*, and at the same time threatening the military's traditional socio-political roles. Pressures from the social, political and international sectors as well as internal desires were forcing the Indonesian military to reform its approaches towards these roles. This was a critical time for both the military and the country; a wrong calculation by the military could possibly throw the country into chaos, or revert it back to the old authoritarian system.

V. CONCLUSION

A. THE ARMED FORCES' SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE IN THE FUTURE

Since the *TNI's* Dual Function has been basic to the *TNI's* origins, it will not be removed from the *TNI* as long as the *TNI* is still in existence. However, the implementation of the *TNI's* Dual Function will be adjusted from time to time to reflect the existing situation. In the future, the *TNI* will operate in a new environment that may challenge the implementation of the *TNI's* Dual Function. The *TNI* must appreciate the trends of Indonesia's future environment.

In the past, the governments in Southeast Asia were the primary players, but increasingly that role has been assumed by multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations such as International Human Rights Organizations, Red Crescent, CARE, and the international financial institutions. They often drive a country's foreign policy considerations, which in turn has a bearing on its national politics. Those organizations will increasingly influence the future concept of the implementation of the *TNI's* Dual Function. This means that the *TNI's* Dual Function must become more acceptable and palatable to the non-governmental organizations, political parties, and to the international community, especially the various international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations. However, to face future challenges, the *TNI* has to take some steps regarding the implementation of the *TNI's* Dual Function in the changing environment.

1. The *TNI* in the New Environment

To determine if the *TNI*'s Dual Function is still relevant or not to present and future Indonesia society, we should look back to the *TNI*'s role in Indonesian history. From the very beginning the *TNI* had a role beyond that which is usually defined for the military. This was due to the manner in which the Indonesian Armed Forces were created, their role in saving the country, and their role in maintaining the unity of the nation. The *TNI* was born from the people, raised by the people, struggled with and for the people, and forms an indispensable part of the nation. The *TNI* perceived itself as the people's army and an integral part of Indonesian society. It has rights similar to other groups in Indonesian society as justified by the 1945 Constitution. The *TNI* became involved in politics because of various factors such as the failure of the civilian politicians that forced the *TNI* to play a bigger socio-political role. The *TNI* remains critical as it is the only force that can ensure that "Pancasila," the five principles, will continue as the national ideology.

From this perspective, we can conclude that the *TNI*'s Dual Function will not be abandoned and will continue to exist in the near future until the civilians are ready to take over and the *TNI* will only focus on defense. Therefore, the Dual Function needs some adjustment in order to meet the developing environment particularly in regard to the strong demand of the people for a more democratic climate in the political life of the country. The problem is how it will be implemented in the future in which Indonesian society is more informed and conscious to its rights. During the Suharto era the *TNI*, especially the army, had made a big mistake when Suharto manipulated the *TNI*

involving it in politics to support his power and his family. The *TNI* was in a sense a victim of Suharto's success, as it had effectively denuded the Indonesian political scene of all effective opposition to Suharto's rule. Suharto applied the dual function in the wrong direction and implemented *Kekaryaan* for the senior officers only to protect his position.

2. The *TNI*'s New Perspective

To face future challenges there are some steps that the *TNI* has to take. The *TNI* has to reevaluate the concept of this Dual Function in order to fit the needs of the existing environment, and also it has to formulate broad guidelines as to how the *TNI*'s Dual Function will be implemented in the near future.

To support the process of democracy, the *TNI* should take a back seat when it comes to politics and allow civilians to take all the initiatives. However, the *TNI* should not completely wash its hands of politics and should prepare to move to the front anytime the situation may demand. Furthermore, the *TNI* should apply the Javanese philosophy "*tut wuri handayani*" in Indonesian political development, which means to supervise from behind. Also this means that the numbers of the *TNI* officers assigned to government will be reduced or will be gradually eliminated.

The *TNI* should withdraw totally from its involvement in the political life of the country and let the civilians lead the government with the idea of reform toward a future democratic state. Thus, in the future the *TNI* will put itself in the back seat to supervise and be ready to take control when the situation requires it, saying nothing but knowing when to exercise its power. If the *TNI* was to take a back seat, as an organization it

should take some necessary steps in order to enhance its capability to judge the existing situation and to be more professional in conducting its dual function.

3. Necessary Steps

The *TNI* both as a defense and socio-political force has to upgrade itself in order to be able to be successful in conducting its mission in the future. Because of this, the *TNI* leadership must determine and take the necessary actions, so that the implementation of the *TNI*'s Dual Function will be more realistic and suitable to the existing environment. Considering past criticisms and tendencies of the future environment, the *TNI* should make some improvements in four major aspects of the future environment namely: political concept, structure, socialization, and professionalism.

a. Political Concept

To avoid the inconsistency in the future, the *TNI* leadership must decide and formulate a clear concept of the *TNI*'s Dual Function. In doing this the *TNI* leadership should always consider the fundamentals of the *TNI* political culture and spirit which is always oriented to the people and to the existence of the country based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In order to achieve this objective, it may be wise if the *TNI* leadership invites all the schools of thought from within the *TNI* and outside experts to formulate the fundamental concept of the *TNI*'s non-military function.

b. Structure

The present *TNI*'s socio-political organization consists of a council organization, staff and executive bodies, and the *TNI*'s civic workers organization. The Council organization called the *TNI*'s Socio-Political Council is a consultative body

which is responsible for formulating policies. The *TNI's* Socio-Political Councils are established in the capital down to the provincial level and are aligned with the structure of the *TNI's* and the government's organization. Staff organization and executive bodies are responsible for assisting the *TNI* leadership in determining policy regarding the *TNI's* function in socio-political affairs. The *TNI's* civic workers' organizations are responsible for coordinating the *TNI's* civic workers in their area of responsibility.

From the present structure of the *TNI's* socio-political affairs one can see that there are no institutions that provide research and development. For future purposes, there is an urgent need for the *TNI's* organization to develop an institution which has special duties of conducting research and development of the *TNI's* political strategies and conceptions. This is required for the *TNI* to successfully achieve its political goals. If the *TNI* as a socio-political force can claim itself to be a stabilizer and dynamizer of political life in the country, it must always come to the table with fresh ideas in order to promote a better political climate in the country. For this reason there is an urgent requirement for the *TNI* to establish an institution that is specially dedicated to doing research and development in the field of socio-political affairs.

c. Socialization

The *TNI* realized that not all Indonesian intellectuals understand the *TNI's* Dual Function. Most of them still perceive the *TNI's* Dual Function as identical to the *TNI's* civic missions (*Kekaryaan*). More extreme views of some of the civilian intellectuals or politicians represent the *TNI's* Dual Function as an obstacle in their efforts to develop democracy in the country. In order to prevent such a misinterpretation of the

TNI's Dual Function, intensive socialization efforts must be implemented which are directed to both the *TNI* and non-*TNI* citizens.

d. Professionalism

The *TNI* with its Dual Function implicitly has two missions. It must be able to defend the country from any threat. In this context, the *TNI* must be able to win a war against any external or internal armed forces that threaten the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the *TNI* must also be able to win a war against socio-political forces that threaten the existence of Republic of Indonesia. To accomplish those missions, the *TNI* personnel must be professional in both military and socio-political fields. Many critics of implementation of the *TNI's* Dual Function have addressed the lack of the *TNI* competence in conducting their mission in the field of socio-political affairs. Present and future challenges facing the *TNI* in the field of socio-political affairs demand that a more qualified retired the *TNI* officer hold political positions either in the executive or in the legislative branch of the government. Consequently, the *TNI* should increase the skills and education of its members. Following are some possible ways to be considered:

(1) Encourage the *TNI* officers to qualify for graduate level education. This alternative will give the *TNI* qualified officers to fulfill the needs of non-military positions.

(2) Talent Scouting. This would require the *TNI* leadership to screen the *TNI* officers in order to find personnel who are potentially qualified for non-military positions. Those officers should be given a chance to obtain their graduate or

higher level education in educational institutions either within the country or abroad. With regard to career management, those officers should be directed to a socio-political career track so that they could be effective. This does not mean that an officer who is potentially qualified for a non-military position will have no military career. They should have a better chance to become the *TNI* leaders in the future because they have some added value compared to others who have only a single kind of experience.

B. REDUCING THE ARMED FORCES' SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLES

"The needs and aspirations of the people are growing. Therefore, the *TNI's* Dual Function needs to be readjusted. In the past we have held civilian posts. In the future, the number can be decreased," said *Kassospol* Lieutenant-General Bambang Yudhoyono in an interview with *Asiaweek* in July 1998. Given Yudhoyono's position, this view will set the tone of the military's initiatives concerning its socio-political role in the near future. In the following months, there were further statements by both prominent military and civilian leaders regarding this issue. However, to date, there have been no concrete plans on how the military would reduce its socio-political involvement in the Indonesian society until General Wiranto announced plans to separate the police from the military in October 1998. I will speculate on how this reduction will play out.

1. A Reduction in Political Influence

What does the future hold for the military in its involvement in the socio-political arena? Politically, the military is likely to fulfill its promise to reform its approach to political interference. However, it is unlikely to totally abandon its exercise of these

functions and "return to the barracks." Instead, it will still retain some influence on the Indonesian political stage, although it is likely to refrain from exerting direct influence on the directions of political developments or hinder the formation of political parties in the same fashion as in *Orde Baru* or the New Order period. This may take the form of a reduced presence in the political apparatus, for example, a reduction in the number of allocated seats both in the *DPR* and the *MPR* as well as in the number of military officers employed in non-military positions in the various ministries. The military is also expected to remain above all the political parties and not just support the most dominant political party. In the past the military had bad experiences when linked with the *GOLKAR*. It is also likely not to interfere in normal governance and political interplay among the various parties, but is likely to retain its option to intervene in case there were political chaos or instability. This will be in line with the military's duty to maintain security and stability in the country, as well as to prevent a repeat of the debacle of the "liberal Democracy" phase of the 1950s.

2. Status Quo in its Social Roles

In the social arena, the military would likely maintain its prominence. This was mainly due to the fact that there are no established governmental and non-governmental organizations capable of replacing the military in these roles. This situation is likely to persist until the present economic crisis eases and when the government can provide sufficient funds for such organizations. Even so, the military would not be likely to relinquish these social roles, as its origins were closely tied to the Indonesian people. Thus, any development of non-military organizations is likely to supplement the military

in conducting social duties, rather than replacing it. Towards this end, the military through its think-tank *Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional* (*Lemhanas* or National Defense Institute) has initiated dialogues with pro-democracy and human rights non-governmental organizations even before the fall of Suharto.¹²¹ These efforts will undoubtedly continue into the future.

Indonesia's top military, Admiral A.S. Widodo, said that "the Indonesian Armed Forces (*TNI*) will withdraw from national politics amid persistent public doubts that the once-powerful institution would return to the barracks." He also mentioned that "the military's socio-political function had been abused in the last three decades and this hampered efforts to turn itself into a professional defense force. The aim now is to concentrate on becoming a professional military, and whoever in the *TNI* decides to take an active part in politics should first resign from his unit and from the military."

C. CONCLUSION

This thesis adapted Alfred Stepan's analysis of the levels of military prerogatives and contestations employed by the military towards the civilian authorities. This model proved to be well suited in the analysis of the Indonesian military's involvement in the socio-political sphere, providing a balanced road map in looking at significant events

¹²¹ A one-day seminar on "*Strengthening People's Participation for the Formation of Civil Society in Indonesia*" was organized by the military on 22 September 1997. The discussions can be found in *Menuju Masyarakat Madani* (Jakarta: PT Penebar Swadaya, 1998).

both objectively and subjectively. As such, it is the writer's opinion that this method could be adapted effectively to analyze other civil-military relations. This thesis has traced the development of the Indonesian military's socio-political role through the decades. It has demonstrated that these roles had their roots in the independence struggle against the Dutch, and the military would find it difficult to relinquish these roles without a strong extra-military impetus. It has also proved the thesis that the Indonesian military's socio-political role was in a state of decline since Suharto came into power in 1966, with the decline most significant since the late 1980s. Possible reasons are also presented, notably the role played by former president Suharto.

An understanding of the circumstances leading to the crystallization and decline of the Indonesian military's socio-political role provides a better insight into Indonesia's extremely dynamic political situation. The coming years will be crucial in the formation of Indonesia's new political landscape, and the military's initiatives in this area will have a definitive effect on new developments. Even with the implementation of more democratic reforms, the military will still likely maintain a stake in the new system. This is to ensure the stability of the social and political situation domestically, as well as to safeguard the country from separation.

The Indonesian military will remain engaged in the socio-political arena in the near future, but when the civilians are ready the military will put itself in the back seat. Without its influence, there is a possibility that Indonesia will revert to the chaotic times of the 1950s. Growth of the backward regions of the archipelago will also be severely hindered if the military does not participate in social programs in these areas. In the

medium to long term, the situation may change with the maturing of democratic movements and the establishment of non-military social organizations. Then the military can concentrate its attention on developing a professional armed force befitting its size and influence in the Southeast Asian region. Furthermore, the important thing is that the *TNI* with its new paradigm must become more acceptable and palatable to the non-government organizations, such as political parties and to the international community, and finally that the *TNI* has a good relationship with Indonesian society in the future.

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